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COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
James M. Wallace, Jr. *
This Article discusses significant cases reported and legislation enacted
during the 1991 Survey period1 involving issues arising under the Uniform
Commercial Code as adopted in Texas.2
I. GENERAL PROVISIONS
A. Determination by the Parties of the Standards of Performance
N PPG Industries, Inc. v. Shell Oil Co.3 the court reviewed a force
majeure clause in an ethylene delivery contract. The clause excused
either party from its obligations under the contract to the extent that
performance was delayed or prevented by circumstances "reasonably beyond
its control or by... explosion .... " The clause thus made any explosion a
force majeure event, including explosions within the control of a party. 4 The
court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment in favor
of the seller for excusable non-performance. 5 The buyer argued that the
force majeure clause contravened section 1.102(c) of the Code6 on the
ground that the clause effectively waived the seller's duties of good faith and
diligence.7 Section 1.102(c) provides that parties may vary the effect of pro-
visions of the Code by agreement, except as otherwise provided in the Code
B.A., Vanderbilt University; J.D., University of Texas. Attorney at Law, Baker &
Botts, Dallas, Texas.
1. The 1991 Survey period generally covers cases reported and legislation enacted from
November 1990 through October 1991.
2. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.101-11.108 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & 1991 &
Supp. 1992) (hereinafter the Code).
3. 919 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1990).
4. While a clause of this type should not shield a party from the consequences of its
intentional misconduct, it does appear to be intended to include explosions resulting from the
negligence of either party. The district court noted that the seller would not intentionally blow
up its refinery to escape its ethylene delivery obligation. See PPG Industries, Inc. v. Shell Oil
Co., 727 F.Supp. 285, 288 (E.D.La. 1989).
5. The court adopted the district court's opinion but noted the district court's failure to
address the applicability of sections 2.615 and 1.102(c) of the Code to the force majeure clause
at issue. 919 F.2d at 18. The court's analysis of section 2.615 of the Code is discussed under
the "Sales" portion of this article.
6. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
7. The buyer incorrectly asserted that section 1.102(c) of the Code creates or imposes
these duties. Section 1.102(c) prevents obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care prescribed by other provisions of the Code from being disclaimed by agreement. See, for
example, section 1.203 (duty of good faith), section 8.406(a)(1) (duty of transfer agent to exer-
cise good faith and due diligence), section 9.504(c) (disposition of collateral must be commer-




and except that the obligations of good faith, diligence, reasonableness and
care prescribed by the Code may not be disclaimed by agreement. Section
1.102(c) further provides that "the parties may by agreement determine the
standards by which the performance of such obligations is to be measured if
such standards are not manifestly unreasonable." 8 The court held that the
force majeure clause at issue did not constitute a manifestly unreasonable
standard of performance under section 1.102(c). 9 It characterized the clause
as the product of anticipation by and allocation of business risks between
sophisticated parties.' 0
B. Obligation of Good Faith
Section 1.203 of the Code provides that "[e]very contract or duty within
this title imposes an obligation of good faith in its performance or enforce-
ment". 1' The court in Schmueser v. Burkburnett Bank 12 noted that, unlike
the common law duty of good faith, the obligation imposed by section 1.203
does not require the existence of a special relationship between the parties. 13
In Schmueser the sellers of a home sued the bank that issued a letter of credit
in the sellers' favor for the account of the buyers. The letter of credit se-
cured the buyers' obligations under a purchase money note. The surviving
buyer defaulted on the note, and the sellers made demand on the bank for
payment under the letter of credit. The bank refused the demand, and the
sellers won a declaratory judgment against the bank in state court. After the
bank paid all amounts due on the letter of credit pursuant to the state court
judgment, the sellers brought this action for damages against the bank, as-
serting claims under state law for breach of the bank's duty of good faith and
violations of the Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act (DTPA).14 The basis
for these claims was the sellers' allegation that the bank misled them regard-
ing the financial condition of the surviving buyer in an attempt to avoid
liability on the letter of credit. The court affirmed the district court's judg-
ment in favor of the sellers on the breach of duty of good faith claim.'I The
8. The court incorrectly quotes this provision as permitting parties "'to determine the
standard [sic] by which the performance of [contractual obligations] is to be measured if such
standards are not manifestly unreasonable' ". 919 F.2d at 19 (first emphasis added). Parties to
a contract covered by the Code may set reasonable or unreasonable standards of performance
for their respective obligations thereunder, except to the extent applicable Code provisions or
general contract law limits this freedom of contract principle. Section 1.102(c) allows the
parties to agree upon standards by which the performance of any applicable obligations of
good faith, diligence, reasonableness and care as prescribed by the Code are to be measured,
provided that the standards chosen are not manifestly unreasonable.
9. 919 F.2d at 19.
10. Id.
11. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
12. 937 F.2d 1025 (5th Cir. 1991).
13. Id. at 1032. The court cited FDIC v. Coleman, 795 S.W.2d 706, 708-09 (Tex. 1990),
for the proposition that the common law duty of good faith requires the existence of a special
relationship. For a summary of the Coleman case, see John Krahmer, Commercial Transac-
tions, Annual Survey of Texas Law, 45 Sw. L.J. 119, 120-21 (1991).
14. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 17.41-.63 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992).
15. 937 F.2d at 1032. The court, however, also affirmed the district court's disallowance
of damages awarded by the jury for this breach for damage to credit and loss of profits on the
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court characterized the sellers' breach of duty of good faith claim as one
sounding only in tort, because no contractual claim remained after satisfac-
tion of the state court judgment. 16 The court held that section 1.203 clearly
applies to letters of credit since letters of credit fall within Title 1 of the
Texas Business and Commerce Code. 17
Section 1.208 of the Code' 8 limits a party's ability to exercise an option to
accelerate payment or performance or to require collateral or additional col-
lateral at will or when the party deems itself insecure. A party may acceler-
ate based on such a provision only if the party in good faith believes that the
prospect of payment or performance is impaired. The burden of establishing
lack of good faith is on the party against whom the acceleration option has
been exercised. In American Bank of Waco v. Waco Airmotive, Inc. 19 the
court held that sufficient evidence existed to support the jury's finding that
the bank wrongfully offset a depositor's checking account balance against a
promissory note obligation of the depositor to the bank, on the basis that the
bank did not act in good faith in accelerating the maturity of the depositor's
note to the bank (so that no matured obligation existed, a prerequisite to a
right of offset). 20 The court held that the jury was entitled to compare the
financial condition of the depositor at the time the note was signed to the
depositor's financial condition at the time of acceleration (sufficient evidence
existed to permit a conclusion that the depositor's financial condition had
not deteriorated).2' Additional evidence existed that the bank officer misled
the depositor about the bank's willingness to consider restructuring the loan
and that the bank disregarded the concerns of its counsel about the legality
of the offset. 22
ground that the damages were not supported by sufficient evidence. Id. at 1030. The court
also agreed with the district court's conclusion that no DTPA claim existed because the sellers
did not qualify as "consumers" under the DTPA. Id. at 1028-29.
16. 937 F.2d at 1029. The court stated that under Texas law " 'a breach of the duty of
good faith and fair dealing will give rise to a cause of action in tort that is separate from any
cause of action for breach of the underlying... contract.' "Id. (quoting Viles v. Security Nat'l
Ins. Co., 788 S.W.2d 566, 567 (Tex. 1990)).
17. 937 F.2d at 1032; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 5 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968
and Supp. 1991). The court also noted that "at least one Texas court has indicated that the
duty of good faith imposed by section 1.203 applied to letters of credit." 937 F.2d at 1032
(citing Travis Bank & Trust v. State, 660 S.W.2d 851, 852 n.1 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no
writ)). The parties in the Schmueser case also stipulated before trial that the bank owed the
sellers a duty of good faith under section 1.203. 937 F.2d at 1032. For the duty of an issuer of
a letter of credit to honor a demand for payment, see section 5.114 of the Code. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1991).
18. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.208 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
19. 818 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ denied).
20. Id. at 170-73. The court, after engaging in a somewhat rambling discussion of the
principles of wrongful offset and wrongful dishonor, remanded the case for a new trial based
on errors made by the trial court in excluding certain testimony and evidence. Id. at 177-78.
21. Id. at 172.
22. Id. at 172-73. The bank officer made the offset, without warning, the day after he told
the depositor that he would present the depositor's restructuring proposal to the bank's direc-
tors. The date of the offset was about two weeks after the note had been executed and about
two and one-half months prior to the stated maturity date of the note.
19921 1421
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C. Choice of Law: the "Reasonable Relation" Test of Section 1.105
Section 1.105(a) of the Code23 allows the parties to choose to have the law
of a state other than Texas govern their rights and duties if the transaction
bears a reasonable relation to that state, unless the transaction falls within
one of the specific areas listed in section 1.105(b).24 In Admiral Insurance
Co. v. Brinkcraft Development, Ltd.25 the court upheld the enforceability of a
clause in a promissory note that had the effect of making New York law
applicable to a loan transaction that had both New York and Texas connec-
tions.26 The note stipulated that it was to be governed by the laws of the
state in which the original payee maintains its principal place of business. A
separate provision in the note specified a New York address as the original
payee's principal place of business. The transaction had the following addi-
tional New York contacts: (i) an individual general partner of the original
payee was a New York resident; (ii) the other general partner of the original
payee had its principal office in New York; (iii) the original payee's limited
partnership certificate stated that its principal place of business was the New
York office of its general partners; (iv) the note stipulated that payments
were to be made at the original payee's New York office; (v) the original
payee maintained its principal office at the same New York address since its
formation; and (vi) the co-makers did in fact remit payments on the note to
the original payee at its principal offices in New York. The court held that
the New York contacts described in clauses (i), (ii), (iv), (v), and (vi) of the
preceding sentence were sufficient to create a reasonable relationship to New
York.27 The court reached its decision notwithstanding the following facts:
(i) the co-makers were a Texas resident and a Texas partnership with princi-
pal offices in Texas; (ii) the original payee was a Texas limited partnership;
(iii) one of the general partners of the original payee was a Texas corpora-
tion; (iv) the note was negotiated and executed in Texas; 28 (v) the original
23. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 and Supp.
1991). The full text of section 1.105(a) is as follows:
Except as provided hereafter in this section, when a transaction bears a reason-
able relation to this state and also to another state or nation the parties may
agree that the law either of this state or of such other state or nation shall govern
their rights and duties. Failing such agreement this title applies to transactions
bearing an appropriate relation to this state.
24. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.105(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 and Supp.
1991). The Code provisions listed in section 1.105(b) specifically address the law applicable to
matters within their scope. The enforceability of a choice of law provision in a transaction not
governed by the Code is determined by analyzing the transaction under section 187 of the
Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws. See DeSantis v. Wackenhut Corp., 793 S.W.2d 670(Tex. 1990), cert. denied, 111 S.Ct. 755 (1991); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) of CONFLICT of
LAWS § 187 (1971).
25. 921 F.2d 591 (5th Cir. 1991).
26. After being sued for non-payment by the holder of the note, the co-makers filed an
answer and counterclaim alleging that the note was usurious under Texas law. The co-makers
apparently acknowledged that the note was not usurious under New York law. The co-makers
also did not dispute that the note was a negotiable instrument governed by Chapter 3 of the
Code. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.104 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
27. 921 F.2d at 593-94.
28. The court ignored a provision in the note stating that the note is deemed to have been
made in New York. Id. at 594.
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payee's limited partnership certificate allowed it to redesignate its principal
place of business; and (vi) the original payee's principal place of business
may actually have been Texas rather than New York (the court deemed it
unnecessary to decide this issue).29
D. Reservation of Rights with Respect to a "Full Payment" Check
Section 1.207 of the Code allows a party to perform or assent to perform-
ance in a manner demanded or offered by the other party without prejudic-
ing any rights explicitly reserved. 30 In Robinson v. Garcia3l the court held
that section 1.207 (i) preempts the common law doctrine of accord and sat-
isfaction 32 and (ii) applies to the tender of a "full-payment" check 33 regard-
less of whether the transaction underlying the check is within the scope of
the Code.34 The plaintiffs in Robinson won a $59,260,000 judgment against
a bank, which they subsequently settled for $10,000,000. A dispute existed
between the plaintiffs and their attorney, the defendant in this case, over the
amount of attorneys' fees payable to him.35 The defendant received the set-
tlement funds and tendered a check to the plaintiffs with the following lan-
guage added as a restrictive endorsement: "acceptance in full and final
settlement and in satisfaction of all claims Cause #C-1948-84-D (Our file
#797-84R)." The plaintiffs added the following language prior to negotiat-
ing the check: "Except for disputed Attys fees and related claims Cause No.
87-35582." After cashing the check the plaintiffs sued the defendant for fail-
ing to distribute the settlement proceeds properly. The trial court granted
29. Id. at 593-94. In making its "reasonable relation" analysis, the court followed its
opinion in Woods-Tucker Leasing Corp. v. Hutcheson-Ingram Dev. Co., 642 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1981). The court also cited Woods-Tucker as foreclosing the co-makers' contentions that
the transaction's contacts with New York were subterfuges designed to evade Texas usury law.
The court quoted language from Woods-Tucker to the effect that the "contrivance exception"
allows the court to disregard a choice of law provision that applies the law of a jurisdiction
with no normal relation to the transaction. The court stated that the note's choice of law
provision was not violative of Texas public policy (the court noted that at the time that it
decided Woods-Tucker, no Texas case had invalidated a choice of law provision in a usury
context on public policy grounds and that Woods-Tucker had not been undercut by any subse-
quent Texas cases). 921 F.2d at 594.
30. The full text of section 1.207 is as follows:
A party who with explicit reservation of rights performs or promises perform-
ance or assents to performance in a manner demanded or offered by the other
party does not thereby prejudice the rights reserved. Such words as "without
prejudice", "under protest" or the like are sufficient.
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
31. 804 S.W.2d 238 (Tex. App-Corpus Christi), writ denied per curiam, 817 S.W.2d 59
(Tex. 1991).
32. Id. at 244-47.
33. The court uses this term to describe a check containing restrictive language intended
to be binding on the payee if the payee cashes the check. Id. at 241 n.2. An example of
language typically used to make a check a "full payment" check is "accepted in full payment
of all amounts due and payable to payee."
34. Id. at 243.
35. The defendant claimed to be entitled to fifty percent plus expenses. The plaintiffs
claimed that the defendant was entitled to thirty-seven and one-half percent plus expenses.




the defendant's motion for summary judgment, which was based solely on
his assertion that the plaintiff's claim was precluded as a matter of law be-
cause a common law accord and satisfaction had occurred between the par-
ties.36 The court of appeals reversed the summary judgment in favor of the
defendant and remanded the case for trial on the merits.3 7
The court criticized and rejected the holding of the Dallas court of appeals
in Hixson v. Cox. 38 The court in Hixson held section 1.207 inapplicable to
an explicit reservation of rights made by a creditor on a full payment check
tendered by a debtor, apparently on the ground that the underlying transac-
tion (i.e., the transaction that gave rise to the right to payment) was not
within the scope of the Code.39 The court likewise criticized the Houston
court of appeals' opinion in Pileco, Inc. v. HCI, Inc.40 and its dictum in
Trevino v. Brookhill Capital Resources.41 In Pileco the Houston court of ap-
peals applied the accord and satisfaction doctrine in lieu of section 1.207 of
the Code on the basis that section 1.207 did not displace the well-established
doctrine of accord and satisfaction. 42 In Trevino the accord and satisfaction
doctrine was superseded by the existence of a fiduciary relationship between
the parties, but the Trevino court took the opportunity to endorse both Pileco
and Hixson.43
The court rejected the Hixson court's narrow interpretation of section
1.207 as applicable only to transactions within the scope of Chapter 2 of the
Code (Sales)." The court noted that Chapter 1 of the Code 45 establishes
36. 804 S.W.2d at 240.
37. Id. at 248.
38. 633 S.W.2d 330 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1982, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 804 S.W.2d at 243-44,
246. The court in Hixson held that an accord and satisfaction had occurred when the creditor
negotiated the check, notwithstanding the creditor's marking through the debtor's restrictive
endorsement and adding explicit language indicating that the check was accepted as part pay-
ment only and without prejudice to the creditor's right to demand full payment of the balance
of the account. 633 S.W.2d at 331.
39. Id. at 331. The underlying transaction was the provision of engineering and related
services. The court in Hixson observed that "none of [the Code chapters following Chapter 1]
purport to deal with the engagement of personal services or with disputes over payment for
such services." Id. The court further observed that "[n]o Texas case has applied § 1.207 to a
check tendered in full settlement of a disputed account, whether the subject of the original
dispute fell within one of the subjects of the code, or not." Id.
40. 735 S.W.2d 561 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
41. 782 S.W.2d 279 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1989, writ denied). The court also
noted that the Houston court of appeals applied the common law accord and satisfaction doc-
trine without any reference to section 1.207 in Yelderman v. McCarthy, 474 S.W.2d 781, 784(Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1971, writ ref'd n.r.e.). 804 S.W.2d at 242 n.3. The
court also commented on the Texarkana court of appeals' failure to consider the availability of
section 1.207 in its discussion of the payee's option either to return a full payment check and
sue the debtor for its full claim or to accept the check in full payment. Id. at 241, discussing
Roylex, Inc. v. S & B Engineers, Inc., 592 S.W.2d 59, 60 (Tex. Civ. App.-Texarkana 1979, no
writ). The court observed that section 1.207 would not have applied had the Texarkana court
considered it, since the payee failed to reserve its rights before cashing the check. 804 S.W.2d
at 241.
42. 735 S.W.2d at 562-63.
43. 782 S.W.2d at 281.
44. 804 S.W.2d at 243; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 2 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968
and Supp. 1991).
45. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. I (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 and Supp. 1991).
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general rules applicable to all subsequent chapters of the Code and that sec-
tion 1.207 does not contain any language limiting its application to specific
transactions. 4 6 As the court observed, the negotiation and indorsement of
and effect of payment of obligations by instruments are regulated by Chapter
3 of the Code (Commercial Paper),47 so that the "tendering of a full pay-
ment check is a Code-covered transaction regardless of the nature of the
underlying obligation."'4 8
The court also rejected the analysis of section 1.103 of the Code adopted
by the Pileco court.49 Section 1.103 embodies the recognition that the Code
derives from the common law and is dependent upon the continued applica-
tion of a large body of supplemental law except to the extent displaced by
particular Code provisions.50 Under the Pileco court's approach, however,
that supplemental body of pre-Code or non-Code law would control over
any conflicting Code provision unless the Code provision expressly stated
that it displaces the particular common law principle in conflict. As the
court in Robinson observed, such an interpretation of section 1.103 is incon-
sistent with the "liberal construction" mandate of section 1.102(a) of the
Code and does not further the policies and purposes of the Code as stated in
section 1.102(b) thereof.51
The court noted the reasoning of the Hixson court and those of other
jurisdictions that since section 1.207 uses only the term "performance" it
does not apply to a full payment check. 52 It rejected that reasoning by not-
ing that comment 1 to section 1.207 speaks of "delivery, acceptance, or pay-
ment".5 3 The court reviewed the legislative history of the Code and found
46. 804 S.W.2d at 243.
47. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. ch. 3 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 and Supp. 1991).
48. 804 S.W.2d at 243. The court also noted that the approach adopted by the Hixson
court causes different results depending on the nature of the underlying transaction. Id. at
243. Restricting the applicability of section 1.207 in this context to checks tendered in pay-
ment for goods purchased appears to run counter to the stated purposes and policies of the
Code and the rules of construction set forth in Chapter 1 thereof. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 1.102(a), (b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
49. 804 S.W.2d at 244-45. As noted by the court, the Pileco court relied primarily on a
1984 decision by Maine's highest court, Stultz Elec. Works v. Marine Hydraulic Eng'g Co.,
484 A.2d 1008 (Me. 1984). Section 1.103 provides that general principles of law and equity
shall supplement the Code unless displaced by particular provisions of the Code. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 1.103 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Comment I to section 1.103 character-
izes section 1.103 as indicating the continued applicability to commercial contracts of all sup-
plemental bodies of law "except insofar as they are explicitly displaced by this Act" (emphasis
added).
50. See James White & Robert Summers, Uniform Commercial Code §§ 2, 5 (3d ed.
1988).
51. 804 S.W.2d at 244. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 1.102(a), (b) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
52. 804 S.W.2d at 246.
53. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.207 comment 1 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (em-
phasis added). The court also rejected the public policy arguments by courts in some jurisdic-
tions that application of section 1.207 to full payment checks would destroy a valuable
settlement tool and overburden the judicial system. 804 S.W.2d at 246. The court notes, to
the contrary, that equitable considerations support its interpretation of section 1.207, which




evidence that the protections afforded by section 1.207 were intended to al-
low a party to accept partial payment without giving up the right to demand
the balance due. 54
The supreme court, in a per curiam opinion denying both parties' applica-
tions for writ of error, held that the court's judgment contained no reversible
error, but that the court should not have reached the issue of whether sec-
tion 1.207 abrogates the common law rule of accord and satisfaction since
the plaintiffs neither raised the issue in the trial court nor briefed it on ap-
peal.35 The supreme court stated that it neither approves nor disapproves of
the court of appeals' discussion or resolution of the issue. 56
II. SALES
A. Scope of Chapter 2
In Morey v. Page57 the owner of a 1967 Bentley consigned it to a third
party for resale. The terms of the consignment agreement authorized the
sale of the Bentley only if the sale resulted in a net return of $20,000 to the
owner. The owner retained the original title to the vehicle. The consignee
sold the Bentley the following month for $9,000. The consignee did not dis-
close the owner's interest to the buyer, nor did he inform the owner of the
sale. After the sale the consignee absconded with the $9,000 paid by the
buyer. The buyer sued the owner, asserting claims of breach of contract and
deceptive trade practices and seeking an order compelling transfer of title to
the buyer. The owner asserted counterclaims, including conversion, and
sought a declaratory judgment that he owned the Bentley. The court af-
firmed the trial court's judgment in favor of the owner.58 The court held
that the Certificate of Title Act 59 controlled over section 2.403(b) of the
Code.6o
54. 804 S.W.2d at 247.
55. Garcia v. Robinson, 817 S.W.2d 59 (Tex. 1991).
56. Id. at 60. The court of appeals in Robinson noted that the highest courts of other
states are split on the issue (with a majority holding that section 1.207 does not preempt the
accord and satisfaction doctrine) and that several states have local comments to section 1.207
expressly applying it to the full payment check situation. 804 S.W.2d at 245. Professors White
and Summers support the applicability of section 1.207 of the Code to a reservation of rights
on a full payment check. See James White & Robert Summers, supra note 50, § 13-24.
57. 802 S.W.2d 779 (Tex. App.-Dalas 1990, no writ).
58. Id. at 787.
59. TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1992), which
provides:
No motor vehicle may be disposed of at a subsequent sale unless the owner
designated in the certificate of title transfers the certificate of title, at the time
the motor vehicle is transferred, on a form prescribed by the [ State Highway]
Department.... No title to any motor vehicle shall pass or vest until the trans-
fer is so executed.
Id. § 33(a).
60. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), which pro-
vides: "[a]ny entrusting of possession of goods to a merchant who deals in goods of that kind
gives him power to transfer all rights of the entruster to a buyer in ordinary course of busi-
ness." The owner did not dispute that the consignee was a merchant who dealt in automobiles




The court acknowledged the apparent conflict between section 33(a) of the
Certificate of Title Act and section 2.403(b) of the Code, but claimed to have
harmonized the two provisions in its opinion in Pfluger v. Colquitt.61 The
court simply appears to have disregarded section 2.403(b). The owner
clearly entrusted the vehicle to the consignee. Section 2.403(c) of the Code
defines the term "entrusting" as including any delivery regardless of any
condition expressed between the parties to the delivery. 62 The court based
its decision on its determination that the consignee did not have actual or
apparent authority to sell the car for $9,000.63 In the court's view, this lack
of authority rendered the sale something other than a transaction between
buyer and seller. 64 Thus, the exception to mandatory compliance with the
Certificate of Title Act (i.e., that a transfer without compliance is effective as
between the parties to the sale) did not apply.65
In Southwestern Bell Telephone Co. v. FDP Corp. 66 FDP sued Southwest-
ern Bell, on grounds of negligence and violation of the DTPA, for lost profits
caused by Southwestern Bell's failure to include in the Yellow Pages an ad-
vertising display for which FDP had contracted. Prior to execution of the
contract a representative of Southwestern Bell had given FDP oral assurance
61. 620 S.W.2d 739 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.). The court in Pfluger
refused to apply section 65 of the Certificate of Title Act. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN. art
6687-1 § 65 (Vernon 1977). Section 65 provides that in case of a conflict between the Certifi-
cate of Title Act and the Code, the Code provisions shall control. The Pfluger court held that
both statutes could be applied without conflict. 620 S.W.2d at 741. In Morey the court de-
scribed its harmonizing analysis in Pfluger as follows:
[the provision in section 2.403(b)] that a merchant is empowered "to transfer all
rights of the entruster" is intended to give the merchant the same power to
transfer which the owner of the goods can exercise. [Accordingly,] if the owner
of a vehicle has no power to dispose of the vehicle without a proper transfer of
the certificate of title, then no merchant to whom the vehicle is entrusted has the
power to dispose of the vehicle without a proper transfer of the certificate.
802 S.W.2d at 784. The court, however, undercuts its analysis by pointing out that "courts
have held that the sale of a car without complying with the Certificate of Title Act is valid and
effective as between the parties to the sale." Id. (citations omitted). In such a case, the buyer
has the right to demand transfer of the certificate of title. Id. Applying the court's analysis,
since the owner can in fact effectively transfer a vehicle without complying with the Certificate
of Title Act, section 2.403(b) of the Code gives the merchant the same power. See TEX. CIv.
STAT. ANN. art. 6687-1 (Vernon 1977 & Supp. 1992); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.403(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). See supra notes 59-60. The concurring opinion in
Pfluger sets forth a better reasoned analysis that a conflict does exist between the Code and the
Certificate of Title Act and that section 2.403 of the Code should prevail to make the sale
effective. 620 S.W.2d at 744-48 (Stephens, J., concurring).
62. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.403(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). See also James
White & Robert Summers, supra note 50, § 3-11 n.26 (listing cases vesting title in buyer in
ordinary course free of original owner's ownership rights).
63. 802 S.W.2d at 784-85.
64. Id. at 785.
65. 802 S.W.2d at 784-85. The court failed to indicate what the sale by the consignee to
the buyer was, if not a buyer-seller transaction. A more persuasive way to harmonize the Code
and the Certificate of Title Act might be to argue that a buyer who buys at a price substantially
below fair market value and fails to obtain a title certificate is either not acting in good faith or
has knowledge that the sale violates a third-party's ownership rights, and therefore, is not a
buyer in the ordinary course of business. See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(9) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
66. 811 S.W.2d 572 (Tex. 1991).
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that FDP's advertisement would be published correctly. A jury found that
Southwestern Bell breached an express warranty that it would publish
FDP's display correctly, but found that FDP sustained no lost profits. The
court of appeals remanded the case for a new trial. The supreme court held
that Southwestern Bell made and breached an express warranty but that its
liability was effectively limited by the terms of the contract to a refund of the
purchase price.67 The supreme court found that the warranty provisions of
Chapter 2 of the Code did not explicitly govern this case because the sale of
advertising is predominantly a service transaction rather than a sale of
goods.68 The court, however, looked to the warranty provisions of the Code
for guidance. 69
In McAdams v. Capitol Products Corp. 70 the plaintiff brought breach of
warranty claims against the manufacturer of a sliding glass door installed in
the apartment in which the plaintiff's daughter had been raped and mur-
dered. The plaintiff's claims were brought under the DTPA, although
based, apparently, on warranties under Chapter 2 of the Code.71 The court
held that the statute of limitations applicable to all actions brought under the
DTPA, including actions based on breach of warranty, was the two-year
period under section 17.565 of the DTPA. 72 The court accordingly held
that the statute of limitations provided by "the statute dealing generally with
the underlying cause of action brought under the [DTPA]" did not govern. 73
67. Id. at 576-77.
68. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.102 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (providing
that Chapter 2 applies to transactions in goods).
69. The court did so on the basis that the Code essentially codified the common law of
warranty. 811 S.W.2d at 575. In particular, the court relied on section 2.313(a)(1), which
states that express warranties are created by an affirmation of fact or a promise by the seller to
the buyer which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain. TEX. Bus.
& COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). In upholding the contractual
limitation of liability, the court noted that the jury found that Southwestern Bell did not com-
mit any of the "laundry list" violations under section 17.46(b) of the DTPA, so that the prohi-
bition of waivers under section 17.42 of the DTPA did not apply. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 17.42, .46 (Vernon 1987 & Supp. 1992). The court also noted that the DTPA does
not create any warranties. The court cited sections 2.71 l(a) and 2.714 of the Code to empha-
size that a cause of action for breach of warranty can exist independently of any cause of action
for breach of contract. TEX. Bus. & COMM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.711(a), .714 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). The court looked to section 2.316 of the Code as evidence that warranties may
be limited or disclaimed. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 &
Supp. 1992).
70. 810 S.W.2d 290 (Tex. App.-Fort Worth 1991, writ denied).
71. The DTPA creates causes of action, but not warranties. Consequently, the warranties
must arise independently of the DTPA. See La Sara Grain Co. v. First Nat'l Bank, 673
S.W.2d 558, 565 (Tex. 1984). The court's opinion in McAdams does not specifically identify
the warranties that the plaintiff claimed were breached.
72. 810 S.W.2d at 292-93 (citing Brooks Fashion Stores v. Northpark Nat'l Bank, 689
S.W.2d 937, 943 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1985, no writ)). See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 17.565 (Vernon 1987), which provides that all actions under the DTPA must be commenced
within two years after occurrence of the act on which the claim is based or within two years
after the consumer discovered or in the exercise of reasonable diligence should have discovered
the act.
73. 810 S.W.2d at 293; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.725 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968). The Code provides that a breach of contract action must be initiated within four years
after the breach occurs, regardless of the aggrieved party's lack of knowledge of the breach




Section 2.313 (a) of the Code provides in part that:
(1) Any affirmation of fact or promise made by the seller to the buyer
which relates to the goods and becomes part of the basis of the bargain
creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the affirma-
tion or promise.
(2) Any description of the goods which is made part of the basis of the
bargain creates an express warranty that the goods shall conform to the
description. 74
In Sweco, Inc. v. Continental Sulphur & Chemical75 the court held that an
affirmation of fact need not have been made for the purpose of inducing the
buyer to purchase the item to become part of the basis of the bargain (and
therefore, an express warranty) under section 2.313. 76 The court was less
clear in its views on whether reliance to any extent by the buyer on the
seller's statements is required for the statements to become part of the basis
of the bargain. 77
year). Id. §§ 2.725(a), (b). Section 2.725(b) additionally provides that "[a] breach of warranty
occurs when tender of delivery is made." Id. § 2.725(b). The court did not address the issue of
whether the trial court erred in sustaining the defendant's special exception that the plaintiff
did not have a DTPA claim on the ground that she was not a "consumer," because the plaintiff
failed to preserve the issue for review. The court determined that the statute of limitation
periods under both section 2.725(a) of the Code (had it applied) and section 17.565 of the
DTPA had expired. 810 S.W.2d at 293.
74. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
75. 808 S.W.2d 112 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, writ denied).
76. Id. at 115. The seller represented that its grinding mill would produce a certain
amount of marketable product per hour. The grinding mill produced at only twenty-five per-
cent of the promised rate, and the ground sulphur produced was not of a marketable quality.
The court affirmed the trial court's award of damages in the amount of the purchase price of
the grinding mill. Id. at 118. The court held that sufficient evidence existed for the jury to find
that the value of the goods accepted was zero. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 2.714(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (providing that "[t]he measure of damages for breach of
warranty is the difference at the time and place of acceptance between the value of the goods
accepted and the value they would have had if they had been as warranted .... "). See also
Integrated Title Data Systems v. Dulaney, 800 S.W.2d 336, 339-41 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990,
no writ) (upholding plaintiff's recovery of product's purchase price plus related labor costs in a
DTPA breach of warranty action where product delivered had no market value). The court
also awarded damages for loss of net profits and attorney's fees. 808 S.W.2d at 117-18.
77. The court noted that commentators have indicated that, given the uncertainty over
the legal meaning of the Code's "basis of the bargain" standard, reliance may not be required
to create an express warranty. 808 S.W.2d at 115-16. See Douglas Whitman, Reliance as an
Element in Product Misrepresentation Suits: A Reconsideration, 35 Sw. L.J. 741, 750 (1981);
James White and Robert Summers, supra note 50, § 9-5 (White and Summers note that the
extent to which the Code has changed pre-Code reliance requirements "is thoroughly un-
clear"; they point out that, while the Code may have created a rebuttable presumption of
reliance, plaintiffs who cannot establish some reliance will usually not prevail). The court
found that the buyer in Sweco did rely on the seller's representations about the production rate
of the grinding mill, but the court did not state the extent to which this reliance influenced its
finding that an express warranty was created. 808 S.W.2d at 116. The court also discussed
comment 3 to section 2.313, which provides that a seller's affirmations of fact about goods are
considered to be part of the description of the goods, so that "no particular reliance on such
statements need be shown in order to weave them into the fabric of the agreement." Id. at 115;
see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.313 comment 3 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (this com-
ment also suggests, however, that this presumption of reliance is rebuttable).
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In Haney v. Purcell Co. 78 the court held that the trial court did not err in
refusing to submit to the jury the plaintiffs' questions on breach of implied
warranty of merchantability. The basis of the plaintiffs' complaint in Haney
was the defendant's sale to the plaintiffs of a house containing undisclosed
graves in the backyard. The court of appeals held that the implied warranty
of merchantability applies only to transactions involving goods, which does
not encompass the construction and sale of a house.79
In Keith v. Stoelting, Inc. 8 0 a terminated employee sued the manufacturer
of a polygraph machine. The employee had been fired after failing a poly-
graph test. In a per curiam opinion, the court rejected the employee's claim
of breach of express warranty on the ground that such claims require direct
privity.8 l The court also rejected the employee's claims of breach of implied
warranties of merchantability and fitness for intended purpose.8 2 The court
noted that in situations involving personal injury Texas courts have extended
the benefits of the implied warranty provisions of the Code to persons with
only horizontal privity with the seller or supplier of the defective product. 83
The court concluded that it could not find any support under Texas law for
allowing someone lacking vertical privity with the seller to maintain a cause
of action for economic loss based on breach of implied warranty under the
Code.8 4
78. 796 S.W.2d 782 (Tex. App.-Houston [lst Dist.] 1990, writ denied). The supreme
court's earlier opinion (770 S.W.2d 566 (Tex. 1989)) remanding this case to the court of ap-
peals is discussed in the 1989 Survey. See John Krahmer, Commercial Transactions, Annual
Survey of Texas Law, 44 Sw. L.J. 171, 176-77 (1990).
79. 796 S.W.2d at 786 (citing G-W-L, Inc. v. Robichaux, 643 S.W.2d 392, 394 (Tex.
1982), overruled on other grounds by Melody Home Mfg. Co. v. Barnes, 741 S.W.2d 349 (Tex.
1987). See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (implied war-
ranty of merchantability). The definition of "goods" is contained in section 2.105 of the Code.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
80. 915 F.2d 996 (5th Cir. 1990).
81. Id. at 999 (citing Texas Processed Plastics, Inc. v. Gray Enterprises, Inc., 592 S.W.2d
412 (Tex. Civ. App.-Tyler 1979, no writ)). But see Indust-Ri-Chem Lab., Inc. v. Par-Pak
Co., 602 S.W.2d 282, 287-88 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1980, no writ) (privity not required to
maintain breach of express warranty action where manufacturer induces the purchase by fur-
nishing samples to a middleman knowing that middleman will use the samples to induce sales
of the product). Direct privity (Le., privity of contract) would have been present if the plaintiff
had purchased the polygraph machine from the manufacturer. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 2.313 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The Texas legislature expressly left the issue of
privity to the courts for determination. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.318 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968).
82. 915 F.2d at 999. Although the court's opinion does not indicate, presumably the
employee was relying on sections 2.314 and 2.315 of the Code. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 2.314, .315 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
83. 915 F.2d at 999 (citing Garcia v. Texas Instruments, Inc., 610 S.W.2d 456 (Tex. 1980)
(personal injury case)). Horizontal privity exists between the original supplier and a non-
purchasing party affected by the product. 915 F.2d at 999.
84. 915 F.2d at 999. The court's opinion on this point is somewhat garbled, but this
statement is a fair condensation of its holding. Vertical privity is privity that "includes all
parties in the distribution chain from the initial supplier of the product to the ultimate pur-
chaser." Garcia, 610 S.W.2d at 463. The court distinguished Nobility Homes of Texas, Inc. v.
Shivers, 577 S.W.2d 77 (Tex. 1977) as a case involving vertical privity. Keith, 915 F.2d at 999.
Although the facts in Nobility Homes involved vertical privity (purchaser of a mobile home
from a dealer sued the manufacturer) the court did not distinguish horizontal privity. The
court stated "we hold that privity is not a requirement for a Uniform Commercial Code im-
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In Jeep Eagle Sales Corp. v. Mack Massey Motors, Inc. 8 5 the buyer of a
Jeep Cherokee sport/utility vehicle sued the selling dealer and the manufac-
turer after the vehicle proved to be totally unsatisfactory for the buyer's in-
tended purpose of towing an Airstream trailer. The Cherokee had a towing
capacity of 5,000 pounds, while the Airstream trailer had a 5,800-pound
gross vehicle weight rating. Prior to the buyer's purchase of the Cherokee,
the sales manager for the dealer investigated the Airstream specifications
and represented to the buyer that the Cherokee was suitable to tow the
trailer and recommended that the buyer purchase the Cherokee. The court
held that the manufacturer did not breach an implied warranty of
merchantability 86 but affirmed the trial court's judgment against the dealer
for violation of the DTPA and for breach of implied warranty of fitness
under section 2.315 of the Code.8 7 The court upheld the trial court's finding
that the dealer's implied warranty of fitness had not been disclaimed, despite
a statement on the purchase order that there were no dealer warranties.8 8
The court noted that (i) no evidence was presented that the buyer was aware
of the disclaimer, (ii) the trial court did not make a finding that the dis-
claimer was conspicuous as a matter of law, and (iii) the jury's finding that
the dealer engaged in unconscionable action or course of action rendered the
warranty disclaimer unenforceable in any event.89
C. Terms
Douglas Electronics, Inc. v. Pinnacle Systems, Inc. 90 involved an action by
a seller of electronic parts on a sworn account and a counterclaim by the
buyer for usury. The court affirmed the trial court's finding that the seller
had charged usurious interest by sending a letter to the buyer stating that
"[e]ffective immediately, we will begin applying the 1.5% per month service
plied warranty action for economic loss." 557 S.W.2d at 81 (emphasis added). The court in
Nobility Homes noted that the knowledge requirement under section 2.315 of the Code (im-
plied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose) protects a manufacturer from unlimited and
unforeseeable liability. 557 S.W.2d at 82-83. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Nobility Homes can be interpreted as supporting the proposition
that a consumer with only horizontal privity can maintain an action against a manufacturer
for breach of the implied warranty of merchantability under section 2.314 of the Code. See
TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
85. 814 S.W.2d 167 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
86. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.314 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
87. 814 S.W.2d at 174-78; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.315 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968), which provides:
Where the seller at the time of contracting has reason to know any particular
purpose for which the goods are required and that the buyer is relying on the
seller's skill or judgment to select or furnish suitable goods, there is unless ex-
cluded or modified under the next section an implied warranty that the goods
shall be fit for such purpose.
Section 2.316 provides that "to exclude or modify any implied warranty of fitness the exclu-
sion must be by a writing and conspicuous." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.316(b) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1992).
88. 814 S.W.2d at 175.
89. Id. On this latter point the court cited Tri-Continental Leasing Corp. v. Law Office of
Richard W. Burns, 710 S.W.2d 604 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1985, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
90. 805 S.W.2d 852 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
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charge on all uncontested account balances over 45 days old" 9 1 and by in-
cluding this charge on a past-due invoice sent to the buyer. 92 The court held
that sufficient evidence supported the trial court's finding that the parties
had no agreement regarding the payment of any interest. 9 3 The court re-
jected the seller's contention that the trial court erred in not applying section
2.207 of the Code,94 holding that section 2.207 applies "when there is an
agreement, either express or implied, to pay a certain monthly interest."
95
Section 2.207(b) sets forth circumstances in which terms in addition to or
different from those offered or agreed upon become part of the contract.
These additional or different terms are contained in an acceptance of an offer
or in a written confirmation of an agreement and are initially construed
under section 2.207(a) as proposals for additions to the contract.
In Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos9 6 the court found that a
provision for interest on past-due account balances, which the seller stamped
on invoices sent to the buyer, became part of the contract under section
2.207(b) of the Code in a situation in which the course of dealing between
the parties was as follows: the buyer sent orders by telex, and the seller
delivered the goods (in this case, liquified petroleum gas) with invoices con-
taining the stamped-on interest provision, to which the buyer never
objected. 97
In OKC Corp. v. UPG, Inc. 98 OKC and UPG were parties to an agreement
under which UPG delivered crude oil to OKC's refinery. OKC later sold its
refinery and assigned the crude oil agreement to the buyer of the refinery.
UPG continued delivering crude oil until the buyer failed to pay for a deliv-
ery. UPG sued OKC, contending that since OKC had merely assigned the
91. Id. at 856.
92. Id. at 856-58. The 18% per annum rate was more than double the statutory 6% rate
allowed in the absence of an agreement between the parties. See TEX. REV. CIV. STAT. ANN.
art. 5069-1.03 (Vernon 1987).
93. 805 S.W.2d at 857-58.
94. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.207 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
95. 805 S.W.2d at 857 (citing Preston Farm & Ranch Supply, Inc. v. Bio-zyme Enter.,
625 S.W.2d 295, 298-99 (Tex. 1981)). Preston Farm does not stand for the proposition for
which it is cited by the court in Douglas Electronics. In Douglas Electronics the seller's attempt
to invoke section 2.207 was misplaced, but the court's analysis of section 2.207 is also some-
what puzzling. If the parties had an agreement that the buyer would pay a certain monthly
interest on past-due account balances, application of section 2.207 to add an interest clause to
the parties' contract would not be necessary. Comment 5 to section 2.207 recognizes that a
clause (contained in a party's acceptance or confirmation) providing for interest on overdue
invoices can be incorporated into the contract pursuant to section 2.207(b). In Douglas Elec-
tronics, however, the interest charge was not part of the seller's offer to sell the goods or its
acceptance of the buyer's offer to purchase the goods. Instead, the seller attempted to impose
the charge after it had sold and delivered the goods to the buyer and after the buyer failed to
pay on the initial invoice. In Preston Farm the supreme court held that "the process of accept-
ance and confirmation to which section 2.207 is addressed stops short of a monthly statement
sent after the goods have been shipped." 625 S.W.2d at 299-300. In Preston Farm the buyer
was held to have accepted the interest charges shown on the monthly statements due to his
conduct in continuing to make purchases and payments with knowledge of the charges. Id. at
300.
96. 934 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1991).
97. Id. at 654.
98. 798 S.W.2d 300 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
1432 [Vol. 45
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
agreement, it remained secondarily liable for a breach. OKC argued that
since the agreement contained no quantity term it was not an enforceable
contract. The court noted that an agreement silent on the issue of quantity
is generally not enforceable. 99 It also noted that the Code does not provide
any gap-filler provisions to supply a missing quantity term. 1°° The court,
however, relying on sections 2.201(c)(3) and 2.204(c) of the Code, 101 held
that the contract was enforceable to the extent of the crude oil actually re-
ceived and accepted by the buyer.102
D. Damages
Section 2.710 of the Code provides that an aggrieved seller's incidental
damages include any commercially reasonable charges or expenses resulting
from the buyer's breach. 10 3 Under Texas law "actual interest expenses on
money borrowed by the seller to finance the subject matter of the contract,
incurred after and as a result of the buyer's breach, are incidental damages
under section 2.710."'14 In Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexica-
nos 10 5 the contract between the parties specified an interest rate that would
accrue on late payments. The buyer argued that awarding both contract
interest and incidental damages under section 2.710 would overcompensate
the seller. The court agreed, holding that the seller was not entitled to inci-
dental damages for accrued financing charges since the contract interest pro-
vision addressed that aspect of damages. 1°6
In Baker v. International Record Syndicate, Inc. 10 7 the court upheld a liq-
uidated damages provision printed on an invoice. In Baker a photographer
was hired to take photographs of the musical group Timbuk-3. He sent 37
negatives to the group's agent. The agent returned them in a damaged con-
dition (holes had been punched in 34 of the negatives). The trial court re-
fused to enforce the provision printed on the photographer's invoice that
stated that "[r]eimbursement for loss or damage shall be determined by a
photograph's reasonable value which shall be no less than $1500 per trans-
99. Id. at 305.
100. Id. The court cited gap-filler Code sections that supply missing terms for price and for
place and time of delivery and payment. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.305, .308-
.310 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
101. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 2.201(c)(3), .204(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
Section 2.201(c)(3) provides that an otherwise valid contract is enforceable, despite lack of a
sufficient writing, with respect to goods that have been received and accepted. Id.
§ 2.201(c)(3). Section 2.204(c) provides that a contract for sale does not fail for indefiniteness
even though one or more terms are left open if the parties intended to make a contract and a
reasonably certain basis exists for granting a remedy. Id. § 2.204(c).
102. 798 S.W.2d at 305.
103. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.710 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
104. Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771, 781 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1980, writ ref'd
n.r.e.).
105. 934 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1991).
106. Id. at 654. The court cited Gray v. West, 608 S.W.2d 771. The court observed that,
had the buyer timely paid the amount due to the seller, the seller could have used that amount
either to pay off financing charges accruing on its inventory or to earn income, but not both.
934 F.2d at 654.
107. 812 S.W.2d 53 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, no writ).
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parency."' 0 8 Instead, the trial court entered judgment for the photographer
on the jury's finding of $15,000 of actual damages. The court of appeals
noted that the determination of whether a contractual clause is enforceable
as a liquidated damages provision or void as a penalty is a question of law. 109
The court looked to section 2.718(a) of the Code. 110 The court, in holding
that $1500 per negative was not an unreasonable estimate of actual damages,
noted that the photographer had sold other photographs at varying prices
($125-$500) and that at least one photograph taken five years earlier had
produced $1500 in income as a result of sales of reproductions. In addition,
the court noted that the music group's potential for fame was an important
factor in the valuation of the negatives and that this potential was unknown
at the time that the photographs were taken."I'
E. Miscellaneous
In Richter v. Bank ofAmerica National Trust & Savings Ass'n 112 the court
held that a bank's foreclosure on the winery assets of its borrower did not
obligate the bank to perform the borrower's contractual obligations to a
third party. 113 All amounts payable to the borrower under the contract had
been assigned and were to be paid directly to the bank pursuant to the bank's
security agreement. 14 The court, relying on section 2.2 10(d) of the Code" 15
and comment 5 thereto, concluded that under Texas law an "assignment of
security" does not obligate the assignee creditor to perform the assignor's
duties.116
In PPG Industries 117 the court rejected the buyer's argument that section
108. Id. at 54-55.
109. Id. at 55. The court apparently assumed that the liquidated damages provision was
part of the parties' contract. It did not consider the applicability of section 2.207 of the Code.
See the discussion of Douglas Electronics and Permian Petroleum, supra notes 90-97 and ac-
companying text.
110. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.718(a) ('Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968), which states
that:
Damages for breach by either party may be liquidated in the agreement but only
at an amount which is reasonable in light of the anticipated or actual harm
caused by the breach, the difficulties of proof of loss, and the inconvenience or
non-feasibility of otherwise obtaining an adequate remedy. A term fixing unrea-
sonably large liquidated damages is void as a penalty.
The court also cited Texas case law on the issue of the enforceability of a liquidated damages
provision. 812 S.W.2d at 55. The court did not indicate whether it viewed this case as
predominantly a sale of goods under the Code or a service transaction governed by common
law.
111. 812 S.W.2d at 55.
112. 939 F.2d 1176 (5th Cir. 1991).
113. Id. at 1191.
114. Id.
115. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.210(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section
2.210(d) provides that general language assigning a contract or all the assignor's rights under a
contract "is an assignment of rights and, unless the language or the circumstances (as in an
assignment for security) indicate to the contrary, it is a delegation of performance of the duties
of the assignor .... " Id.
116. 939 F.2d at 1191.
117. 919 F.2d 17 (5th Cir. 1990).
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2.615 of the Code'1 8 imposes, as a matter of law, a requirement that all force
majeure events be beyond the parties' reasonable control.' 1 9 According to
the court, a plain reading of comment 8 to section 2.615 reveals that the only
limitation is "mercantile sense and reason."' 20 The court declined to substi-
tute its mercantile sense and reason for that of the two sophisticated parties
to the suit.' 21
Section 2.607(c) of the Code requires a buyer who has accepted a tender of
goods to notify the seller of a breach within a reasonable time after the buyer
discovers or should have discovered the breach. 122 Failure timely to notify
the seller of a breach bars the buyer from any remedy. 123 In Leggett v. Brin-
son 124 the court held that sufficient evidence existed to support the conclu-
sion that the buyer had given the seller of a refrigerator sufficient
opportunity to repair a broken ice maker. 25 Both the seller's agent and the
manufacturer's service agent had attempted, unsuccessfully, to repair the ice
maker. After the buyer filed a DTPA suit, the seller took a new unit to the
buyer's home for installation but was refused admittance. The court cited
section 2.607(c)(1) for the proposition that "a buyer is required to notify a
seller that a breach of warranty has occurred in order to allow the seller an
118. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.615(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section 2.615
provides, in part, that "non-delivery in whole or in part by a seller.., is not a breach of his
duty under a contract for sale if performance as agreed has been made impracticable by the
occurrence of a contingency the non-occurrence of which was a basic assumption on which the
contract was made .... " Id.
119. 919 F.2d at 19.
120. Id. Comment 8 provides, in part, as follows:
Generally, express agreements as to exemptions designed to enlarge upon or
supplant the provisions of [section 2.615] are to be read in the light of mercantile
sense and reason, for [section 2.615] sets up the commercial standard for normal
and reasonable interpretation and provides a minimum beyond which agreement
may not go.
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.615 comment 8 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
The court found uncontrolling its dictum in Nissho-Iwai Co., Ltd. v. Occidental Crude Sales
Inc., 729 F.2d 1530 (5th Cir. 1984), that section 2.615 probably would require application of a
"reasonable control" exception to force majeure clauses. PPG Industries, 919 F.2d at 19. The
court also expressly rejected a commentator's suggestion that section 2.615 imposes a non-
alterable standard governing the interpretation of exemption clauses. Id. See Hawkland, The
Energy Crisis and § 2.615 of the Uniform Commercial Code, 79 COM. L.J. 75, 79 (1974). The
portion of comment 8 to section 2.615 that indicates that the performance exemption standard
set up by section 2.615 "provides a minimum beyond which agreement may not go" is not
supported by the text of section 2.615 and contravenes section 1.102(c) of the Code (which
provides that the provisions of the Code may be varied by agreement except as otherwise
provided in the Code). TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
Section 2.615 is intended to cover situations in which the seller's performance has been ren-
dered impracticable by unforeseen intervening circumstances not contemplated by the parties
at the time of contracting. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.615 comment 1 (Tex
UCC) (Vernon 1968). In PPG Industries the parties did foresee the possibility that an explo-
sion could occur, and they allocated that risk to the buyer. Section 2.615 is inapplicable in that
situation.
121. 919 F.2d at 19.
122. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 2.607(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
123. Id. § 2.607(c)(1).
124. 817 S.W.2d 154 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1991, no writ).
125. Id. at 158.
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opportunity to cure the defect, if any."' 126 Section 2.607(c)(1) requires the
buyer timely to notify the seller of a breach, but it does not give the seller
any cure rights.' 27 Comment 4 to section 2.607 indicates that the purpose of
the notification requirement is to open "the way for normal settlement
through negotiation."'' 28
III. COMMERCIAL PAPER
A. Waiver of Notice of Intent to Accelerate
In Shumway v. Horizon Credit Corp. 129 the supreme court held that lan-
guage in promissory notes waiving demand or presentment and notice or
notice of acceleration is effective to waive presentment and notice of acceler-
ation but not notice of intent to accelerate.' 30 In Shumway the note stated
that upon default by the borrower the lender could require that all unpaid
principal and accrued interest "be paid at once without prior notice or de-
mand."' 3 1 The lender did not dispute that it had not made demand on the
borrower for payment prior to acceleration and had not given the borrower
notice of intent to accelerate or notice of acceleration. The sole issue before
the court was whether the waiver provision in the note was effective to waive
the borrower's rights of presentment, notice of intent to accelerate, and no-
tice of acceleration. 1 32
The court noted that demand on the maker of a promissory note for pay-
ment is called "presentment" under the Code.' 33 It also noted the general
rule that the Code does not require presentment to a maker or other party
primarily liable on the note. ' 34 The court cited its prior decisions that recog-
nized the following common law exception to this general rule: unless
waived, '35 presentment to the maker of a note, notice of intent to accelerate
and notice of acceleration are required prior to acceleration by the holder of
126. Id. The court also cited Miller v. Spencer, 732 S.W.2d 758 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1987,
no writ) for this proposition. 817 S.W.2d at 158. The court in Miller stated in dictum that
section 2.607(c)(1) of the Code requires the buyer to notify the seller that a breach of warranty
has occurred and to give the seller an opportunity to cure. 732 S.W.2d at 760-61.
127. Compare section 2.508 of the Code, which does give the seller in certain circum-
stances a right to cure after a rejection by the buyer of non-conforming goods. TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 2.508 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
128. Id. § 2.607 comment 4. See also James White & Robert Summers, supra note 50,
§ 11-10.
129. 801 S.W.2d 890 (Tex. 1991).
130. Id. at 893-94.
131. Id. at 892.
132. Id.
133. Id. at 892. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.504(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)("Presentment is a demand for acceptance or payment made upon the maker, acceptor, drawee
or other payor by or on behalf of the holder").
134. 801 S.W.2d at 892. The court cited section 3.501 of the Code. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.501 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1992). Section 3.501(a) sets out the
circumstances in which presentment is necessary to charge a secondary party (i.e., a drawer or
indorser). Comment I to section 3.501 indicates that section 3.501 contains all provisions
pertaining to when presentment for payment is necessary.
135. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.51 l(b)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section
3.51 l(b)(I), which was cited by the court, provides that: "Presentment or notice or protest as
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the time for any payment due on the note.136 The court held that, to be
effective, waivers of presentment, notice of intent to accelerate and notice of
acceleration must be clear and unequivocal. 137 The court stated that "[t]he
harshness of the option of accelerating the maturity of an extended obliga-
tion requires both a strict reading of the terms of the option and notice to the
debtor."138
The court interpreted the "clear and unequivocal" standard to mean that
"a waiver provision must state specifically and separately the rights surren-
dered." 139 The court emphasized that notice of intent to accelerate is a right
separate from notice of acceleration, and it held that waiver of "notice" or
"all notice" or "any notice whatsoever" does not clearly and unequivocally
indicate that the borrower intended to waive both notice of acceleration and
notice of intent to accelerate. 14° The court's reasoning on this latter point
was that the language does not put the borrower on notice that he has the
right to notice of intent to accelerate. 14 1 The court held that a waiver of
"notice of intent to accelerate" is effective to waive that right, and it ex-
pressly disapproved seven courts of appeals cases that held more general
waivers of notice effective to waive notice of intent to accelerate. 142
Justice Mauzy wrote a concurring opinion in which he characterized as
mere dicta the general discussion in the majority opinion of the enforceabil-
ity of various waiver provisions.' 43 He further opined that he would hold
that "the contractual waiver of the maker's right to demand for payment,
notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration is void as against
public policy and therefore unenforceable."'" Mauzy stated that commer-
cial lending practices have revealed that borrowers rarely read or understand
these boilerplate waiver provisions, and that even if they do, they have no
power to delete or modify them.1'5 He argued that equity demands that a
maker always have a meaningful opportunity to cure any default before the
lender is permitted to accelerate the note, dispose of the collateral, and sue
the case may be is entirely excused when the party to be charged has waived it expressly or by
implication either before or after it is due." Id.
The notice referred to in section 3.511 is notice of dishonor, not notice of acceleration or
intent to accelerate. The court, citing Sydnor v. Gascoigne, 11 Tex. 449, 456 (1854), Ogden v.
Gibralter Say. Ass'n, 640 S.W.2d 232, 233 (Tex. 1982), and a plethora of Texas courts of
appeals decisions, indicated that it is well established under Texas law that parties to a promis-
sory note can waive presentment and notice of intent to accelerate and notice of acceleration.
801 S.W.2d at 892-93.
136. 801 S.W.2d at 892 (citing Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 233; Allen Sales & Servicenter v.
Ryan, 525 S.W.2d 863, 865 (Tex. 1975); Faulk v. Futch, 147 Tex. 253, 214 S.W.2d 614, 616-17
(1948)).
137. 801 S.W.2d at 893 (citing Ogden, 640 S.W.2d at 234; Ramo, Inc. v. English, 500
S.W.2d 461, 466 (Tex. 1973)).
138. 801 S.W.2d at 893.
139. Id.
140. Id. at 894.
141. Id. at 894 n.7. The court stated that a general waiver of notice is adequate to waive
notice of acceleration since the waiver relates to the right of acceleration in the note. Id.
142. Id. at 894.
143. 801 S.W.2d at 895 (Mauzy, J., concurring).
144. Id.
145. Id. at 895-96.
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for a deficiency judgment. 146
In Athari v. Hutheson 147 the court, in a per curiam opinion, applied the
"clear and unequivocal" test set forth in Shum way to a waiver provision that
allowed the holder to accelerate the note "without further demand, notice or
presentment." The court held that the provision was not effective to waive
notice of intent to accelerate.' 48
B. Federal Holder in Due Course Doctrine
The federal holder in due course doctrine was applied in Smith v.
FDIC. 149 The federal holder in due course doctrine is a federal common law
principle developed by the courts to assist the Federal Deposit Insurance
Corporation (FDIC) 150 in achieving its congressional mandate to ensure the
uninterrupted operations of the banking system and the safety and liquidity
of bank deposits. 151 It facilitates the disposal of assets of failed institutions
by allowing the FDIC to complete purchase and assumption transactions
quickly and without discount for contingent exposure to personal defenses to
enforcement of promissory notes acquired from the failed institutions. 152
This doctrine generally allows the FDIC, when it acquires the assets of a
failed bank, to become a holder in due course of the negotiable promissory
notes included in the assets of the failed bank. 153
146. Id. at 896. Mauzy concluded: "To hold otherwise places this court in the position of
enforcing a contract that "no man in his senses and not under delusion. would make on the one
hand, and [which] no honest and fair man would accept on the other." Id. (quoting Earl of
Chesterfield v. Janssen, 2 Ves. Sen. 125, 155, 28 Eng. Rep. 82, 100 (1750)).
147. 801 S.W.2d 896 (Tex. 1991).
148. Id. at 897.
149. 800 S.W.2d 648 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1990, writ dism'd by agr.).
150. The doctrine also assisted the Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation. Pur-
suant to the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, the Fed-
eral Savings and Loan Insurance Corporation was dissolved, and its receivership functions
were transferred to the FDIC and the Resolution Trust Corporation (RTC). See Financial
Institutions Reform, Recovery and Enforcement Act of 1989, Pub. L. No. 101-73, §§ 401(a),
215(a), 501, 103 Stat. 183, 354, 252, 363 (1989).
151. For additional protections available to the FDIC, see D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v.
FDIC, 315 U.S. 447 (1942), and 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) (West 1989).
152. See Sunbelt Say., FSB v. Montross, 923 F.2d 353, clarified on reh'g per curiam, RTC
v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
153. See FSLIC v. Murray, 853 F.2d 1251, 1256 (5th Cir. 1988). Achieving holder in due
course status allows the FDIC (and its successors) to take the notes free from all third-party
claims and free from all defenses of any party to the instrument with whom the holder has not
dealt (with certain limited exceptions). TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.305, .201 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968). The defenses listed in Section 3.305(b) have been called real defenses,
while other defenses that are subject to being cut off by a holder in due course have been called
personal defenses. See Campbell Leasing, 901 F.2d at 1249. See also FSLIC v. Griffin, 935
F.2d 691, 697 n.3 (5th Cir. 1991), petition for cert. filed, 60 U.S.L.W. 3420 (U.S. Nov. 18,
1991) (No. 91-809) (listing so-called real defenses). In Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC, 901
F.2d 1244, 1249 (5th Cir. 1990), the Fifth Circuit court of appeals held that the FDIC can
become a holder in due course without complying with the requirements under the Code.
Campbell Leasing was discussed in the 1990 Survey. See John Krahmer, supra note 13, at 128-
29. The Code requirements for holder in due course status are that the holder takes the instru-
ment for value, in good faith, and without notice that it is overdue or has been dishonored or of
any defense against or claim to it. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302(a) (Vernon 1968).
Section 3.302(b) of the Code was the primary stumbling block faced by the FDIC in its acqui-
sitions, via bulk purchase and assumption transactions, of notes held by failed financial institu-
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In Smith the FDIC acquired the borrower's note as part of a bulk
purchase of the assets of a failed bank. The FDIC's purchase occurred after
the failed bank sold the collateral securing the note. The sale of collateral
satisfied only 10% of the outstanding balance of the note. In response to the
FDIC's motion for summary judgment for collection of the balance of the
note, the borrower asserted that the FDIC failed to prove the collateral was
disposed of in a commercially reasonable manner."1 54 The court first held
that the issue of commercial reasonableness of a sale of collateral is a defense
that must be asserted by the borrower, and it noted that pursuant to section
3.305 of the Code1 55 a holder in due course takes the note free from this
defense.15 6 The court discussed the policies underlying the federal holder in
due course doctrine 1" and held that the FDIC was a holder in due course
and took the note free of the defense of sale of collateral in a commercially
unreasonable manner. 58
An important limitation on the federal holder in due course doctrine was
imposed by the Fifth Circuit court of appeals in Sunbelt Savings, FSB v.
Montross.159 The court refused to extend the federal holder in due course
doctrine to non-negotiable instruments.1 60 In Sunbelt Savings the FSLIC, as
tions. It provides that a holder does not become a holder in due course of an instrument "by
purchasing it as part of a bulk transaction not in regular course of business of the transferor."
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.302(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
154. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(c) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
155. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
156. Smith, 800 S.W.2d at 651. As the court noted, the Texas courts of appeals are split on
the question whether commercial reasonableness is an affirmative defense or part of the note-
holder's cause of action. Id. at 650. Greathouse v. Charter Nat'l Bank-Southwest, 795 S.W.2d
I (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1990, writ granted), discussed in the 1990 Survey, was
argued before the supreme court on February 20, 1991, but no opinion had been issued at the
time of this writing. See John Krahmer, supra note 13, at 146-47.
157. 800 S.W.2d at 651. The court cited FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d 156, 159-60 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 474 U.S. 944 (1985), Campbell Leasing, 901 F.2d at 1249, and its opinion in
NCNB v. Campise, 788 S.W.2d 115 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist] 1990, writ denied). Id.
158. 800 S.W.2d at 651-52. In another recent case, the Resolution Trust Corporation was
denied the benefit of the federal holder in due course doctrine when it attempted to invoke the
doctrine for the first time on appeal in support of a deficiency judgment that the RTC acquired
in its capacity as receiver of a failed thrift. The court reversed the deficiency judgment and
rendered judgment in favor of the borrower, holding that the thrift failed to prove (after the
borrower had pleaded to the contrary) that the thrift sold the collateral in a commercially
reasonable manner. The court noted that the particular asset that the RTC acquired was a
state court judgment on the note, which "is not a negotiable instrument." The court stated
that "there is no such thing as a holder in due course of a judgment." The court seemed to
recognize that the RTC also acquired the note, but apparently took the position that the judg-
ment changed the character of the asset acquired. The court also took the position, expressly
contrary to decisions of the Dallas court of appeals that the court cited, that the RTC cannot
assert a holder in due course defense for the first time on appeal. See Beach v. RTC, 821
S.W.2d 241 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] n.w.h.).
159. 923 F.2d 353, clarified on reh'g per curiam, RTC v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227 (5th Cir.
1991) (en banc). The Dallas court of appeals has adopted the same limitation in a case involv-
ing facts similar to those in Sunbelt Savings. See Gibbs v. Bank One, Texas, No. 05-90-01562-
CV, 1991 WL 174352 (Tex. App.-Dallas Sept. 5, 1991, n.w.h.). The court quoted heavily
from the Sunbelt Savings opinion. The Gibbs opinion had not been released for publication in
the South Western Reporter as of the date of this writing.
160. 923 F.2d 354, 358. Holder in due course status is available under the Code only with
respect to negotiable instruments. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.102(a)(5), .302(a)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
1992] 1439
SOUTHWESTERN LAW JOURNAL
part of the transfer of assets of a failed thrift, transferred to the acquiring
institution (which was controlled by the FSLIC) a promissory note with a
variable interest rate. The acquiring institution intervened in this deficiency
suit and moved for summary judgment on the ground that the federal holder
in due course doctrine barred the defenses asserted by the maker. The dis-
trict court agreed.' 6 1
The court of appeals reversed and remanded the case, holding that as a
matter of federal common law the federal holder in due course doctrine does
not apply to non-negotiable instruments. 62 The court narrowly construed
its decisions in FSLIC v. Murray163 and Campbell Leasing, Inc. v. FDIC,164
stating that its holding in Murray was expressly limited to negotiable instru-
ments acquired in purchase and assumption transactions and that Campbell
Leasing "did not deal with negotiability at all" but rather "merely excused
the FDIC from compliance with the bulk transfer exclusion of Texas holder
in due course law."' 165 The court rationalized that Murray, Campbell Leas-
ing, D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC,166 and section 1823(e) 167 all prevent
the FDIC from being disadvantaged by the acquisition of notes in purchase
and assumption transactions, without altering the nature of the assets ac-
quired, whereas applying the doctrine to non-negotiable instruments would
bestow value on the FDIC that was unavailable to the predecessor bank by
changing the nature of the asset from a non-negotiable instrument to a nego-
tiable instrument. 168 The court also justified its holding by emphasizing the
reasonable commercial expectations of makers of variable-rate notes that
their defenses would remain unimpaired. 169
161. See 923 F.2d at 354.
162. 923 F.2d at 354, 357. In the panel decision the court assumed, without discussion,
that a variable interest rate note was a non-negotiable instrument. In the en banc decision on
rehearing the court reinstated the panel decision except to the extent that it could be read as
implicitly holding that variable interest rate notes are non-negotiable instruments under the
Code. The court stated "we take no position on the effect of the variable interest rate on the
negotiability of the note", and it noted that both parties accepted the non-negotiability of the
note. 944 F.2d at 228. The Texas supreme court, answering a certified question from the Fifth
Circuit court of appeals, has just determined that "a promissory note requiring interest to be
charged at a rate that can be determined only by reference to a bank's published prime rate is a
negotiable instrument as defined by the Texas Uniform Commercial Code." See Ackerman v.
FDIC, 930 F.2d 3 (5th Cir. 1991), certified question answered sub nom., Amberboy v. Societe
de Banque Privee, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 621, 625 (April 15, 1992). The Amberboy decision was
issued too late to be included in the text of this article. It is a significant decision that overrules
prior Texas case law to the contrary. For additional discussion of this issue, see infra note 173.
163. 853 F.2d 1251 (5th Cir. 1988).
164. 901 F.2d 1244 (5th Cir. 1990).
165. 923 F.2d at 356.
166. 315 U.S. 447 (1942).
167. 12 U.S.C.A. § 1823(e) (West 1989).
168. 923 F.2d at 356.
169. 923 F.2d at 356-57. In reality, economic factors seem more likely to drive the deci-
sions of banks and borrowers about whether particular notes should be fixed or floating rate.
Apart from its analysis of the commercial expectations of variable-rate notemakers, the court
did correctly point out that the maker of a negotiable instrument is on notice that any personal
defenses he may have are subject to being cut off at any time by a transfer of the instrument to
a holder in due course, and that, accordingly, giving the FDIC holder in due course status with
respect to these instruments does not disrupt commercial relationships predicated on state law.
See FDIC v. Wood, 758 F.2d at 161.
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The court, stating that "[a]lchemy is the province of Congress," likened
the application of the federal holder in due course status to non-negotiable
instruments to giving the FDIC the ability to "transmute lead into gold." 170
The court stated that "[n]egotiability is the foundation underlying all of Ar-
ticle Three and of holder in due course status in particular."1 7' The negotia-
ble/non-negotiable distinction made by the court bears scrutiny. The
argument that applying the federal holder in due course doctrine to non-
negotiable instruments changes their nature and provides a windfall to the
FDIC is valid in the sense that the FDIC would be able to avoid personal
defenses to enforcement of the instrument and to vest its transferee with the
same status.' 72 It is equally true, however, that while applying the federal
holder in due course doctrine to all negotiable instruments acquired by the
FDIC in bulk transfers from failed banks does not technically "alter the
nature of the asset acquired" (Le., the instruments remain negotiable instru-
ments), it does bestow extra value on the FDIC by "transmuting" negotiable
instruments with impaired value due to the existence of otherwise applicable
Code-imposed impediments to holder in due course status (e.g., notice of
defenses, notice that the note is overdue, bulk transfer, etc.) into sanitized
instruments in the hands of the FDIC, even in circumstances in which it
would have been unlikely that any other transferee, as a practical matter,
could have qualified for holder in due course status (for example, where a
note is being litigated prior to the transfer, with lender liability counter-
claims or other defenses asserted in the pleadings).
Federal policy considerations weigh heavily in the area of FDIC/RTC
superpowers. By imposing an arbitrary limit on the breadth of the FDIC's
and RTC's powers in dealing with failed financial institutions and minimiz-
ing losses, the court's decision may elicit a legislative response. The court's
reasoning in Sunbelt Savings, while arguably oversimplified, might be attrib-
utable to a determination by the court to pick a convenient bright-line
boundary and thereby sidestep a perceived judicial minefield by preempting
any need to decide, in piecemeal fashion, whether particular non-negotiable
instruments are subject to the federal holder in due course doctrine. The
reasons for non-negotiability are varied. It is one thing to extend the doc-
trine to variable-rate notes, 173 but would be quite another, for example, to
170. 923 F.2d at 357.
171. Id. at 356.
172. See supra note 153.
173. See Amberboy v. Societe de Banque Privee, 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. 621 (April 15, 1992).
The Texas supreme court, in determining that variable rate notes are negotiable instruments
under the Code, relied in large part on section 1.102(b) of the Code and comment I to section
1.102. See 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 621, 624; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.102 (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968). As professors White and Summers point out, the new Article 3 prepared by
drafters of proposed amendments to the Uniform Commercial Code will make variable-rate
notes negotiable. White and Summers also note that a number of states have amended Article
3 to make variable-rate notes negotiable instruments. See James White & Robert Summers,
supra note 50, § 14-4 (Supp. 1991). White and Summers endorse extending negotiability to
variable-rate notes, but believe that the existing provisions of Article 3 of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code do not provide a basis for doing so. They cite Tanenbaum v. Agri-Capital, Inc.,
885 F.2d 464 (8th Cir. 1989) as one of two cases that "have recently held variable rate notes to
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extend it to an instrument containing a clearly conditional promise or
order. 174
C. Causes of Action
To maintain a cause of action on a promissory note the plaintiff must
establish that he is the holder or owner of the note. 175 In Jernigan v. Bank
One, Texas 176 the bank sued on a defaulted note that it claimed to have
acquired from the FDIC in a purchase and assumption transaction. The
court reversed and remanded a summary judgment in favor of the bank,
holding that as a matter of law the bank failed to establish that it was the
holder or owner of the note. The note in Jernigan had been indorsed to the
Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas prior to the failure of the original payee
bank, and the plaintiff bank failed to show that it had possession of the note
or that the note had been further indorsed. Because of the unexplained in-
dorsement and the possibility of an intermediate transfer, the court held as
insufficient the "bare allegation of ownership" asserted in an affidavit of a
vice president of the bank. 177
D. Action on Underlying Obligation by Subsequent Holder of Dishonored
Instrument
In J. W.D., Inc. v. Federal Insurance Co. 178 three convenience stores that
cashed wages checks issued by a construction subcontractor to its laborers
were successful in asserting claims for payment under the general contrac-
tor's payment bond after the checks were dishonored due to insufficient
be negotiable under the existing Article 3." Id. at 71, n.6. They commended the Agri-Capital
court for "doing good" but criticized it for paying "less than due respect" to the Code and to
"well developed Texas state law to the contrary." Id. As noted above, Texas state law has just
changed. In Agri-Capital the court purported to be interpreting section 3.104 of the Code but
applied its own "commercial certainty" test as formulated in a 1904 Eighth Circuit case it
cited. 885 F.2d at 468. The Texas supreme court in Amberboy cited Agri-Capital in support of
its holding. 35 Tex. Sup. Ct. J. at 623.
174. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.104(a)(2), .105 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
Notwithstanding its opinion in Sunbelt Savings, however, the court has recognized that "[i]n
the realm of commercial law, there is a continuum, from agreements which differ from negoti-
able instruments in only minor respects, to those, such as ordinary contracts, which fail en-
tirely to satisfy the requirements of negotiable instruments", and it has indicated a willingness
to apply section 1823(e) to non-negotiable instruments falling within the appropriate portion of
this continuum. See FDIC v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co., 947 F.2d 196, 205-06 n.9 (5th Cir.
1991) (refusing to extend section 1823(e) to cut off a fraudulent misrepresentation defense to
payment on a bankers blanket insurance bond acquired by the FDIC in a purchase and as-
sumption transaction).
175. See, e.g., TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.301, .307(b), .804 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968). To be a holder (with respect to a promissory note) the person must have possession of
an instrument drawn, issued or indorsed to him or to his order or to bearer or in blank. TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(20) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
176. 803 S.W.2d 774 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1991, no writ).
177. Id. at 777. The affidavit stated that the bank acquired the note in the purchase and
assumption transaction. Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.201(c) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968) ("Negotiation takes effect only when the indorsement is made and until that
time there is no presumption that the transferee is the owner") and comment 8 to section
3.201.
178. 806 S.W.2d 327 (Tex. App.-Austin 1991, no writ).
1442 [Vol. 45
COMMERCIAL TRANSACTIONS
funds in the subcontractor's account. The court held that the stores, as
holders 79 of the dishonored checks, could bring an action on the subcon-
tractor's underlying obligation to pay the wages for which the checks had
been issued.'8 0 The basis for this holding was the court's conclusion that
pursuant to section 3.802(a) of the Code any holder of an instrument - not
just the original payee - is entitled to maintain an action on the underlying
obligation.' 8 ' The court stated that, in effect, the laborers' right to receive
wages from the subcontractor had been assigned to the stores by the negotia-
tion of the checks.' 8 2 The court then held that when the wage claims were
assigned the stores also became equitable assignees of the laborers' right to
pursue payment from the surety under the general contractor's payment
bond. 18 3
E. Statute of Limitations and Forged Indorsements
In Toro v. First City Bank- Westheimer Plaza'8 4 the court held that the
two-year limitations period stipulated by section 16.003(a) of the Texas Civil
Practice and Remedies Code 85 is the applicable limitations period for an
action for conversion based on payment of an instrument on a forged in-
179. The checks were negotiable instruments that were properly indorsed and delivered to
the stores. The stores, accordingly, became holders of the instruments. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 1.201(20), 3.202 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968 & Supp. 1992).
180. 806 S.W.2d at 329.
181. Id. Section 3.802(a)(2) of the Code provides that if an instrument that has been taken
for an underlying obligation is dishonored, an action "may be maintained on either the instru-
ment or the obligation." TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.802(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968). Section 3.802 does not state who may maintain the action. The court relied on com-
ment 3 to section 3.802, which uses the term "the holder" in its explanation of section
3.802(a)(2). See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.301 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (right
of a holder to enforce payment); § 3.507 (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (holder's right of recourse
upon dishonor).
182. 806 S.W.2d at 329, 331.
183. 806 S.W.2d at 329-32. The court characterized the bond as a form of security and
drew an analogy to Texas cases holding that a mortgage on real estate follows the debt it
secures without the necessity of an express assignment. Id. at 330. It also noted that the
McGregor Act expressly allows bond claims to be assigned. Id. at 331 (citing TEX. REV. Civ.
STAT. ANN. art. 5160(C)(d) (Vernon 1987)). The court reversed the trial court's summary
judgment in favor of the bonding company and rendered judgment against it in favor of the
stores for the amounts of the checks cashed plus attorneys' fees, interest, and costs of court.
806 S.W.2d at 332.
184. 821 S.W.2d 633 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, writ denied).
185. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.003(a) (Vernon 1986) ("A person must
bring suit for.., conversion of personal property ... not later than two years after the day the
cause of action accrues").
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dorsement. 186 In Community National Bank v. Channelview Bank 187 the
court rejected the bank's forged indorsement defense and held that the in-
dorsement of a cashier's check by use of a fictitious name was an authorized
indorsement and therefore effective to transfer title to the instrument to the
intended transferee. 188 The basis for the court's holding was that the person
from whose account funds were debited to pay for the cashier's check au-
thorized the bank to issue the check with the fictitious name inserted as the
payee, and that same person indorsed the check using the fictitious name (as
well as his real name). Accordingly, the court held that the bank that issued
the cashier's check was liable to the holder who presented it for payment. 189
The court reviewed the Code provisions pertaining to unauthorized signa-
tures and indorsements19° and noted that the person who obtained and in-
dorsed the cashier's check used the fictitious name "for his own personal
convenience. " 191
IV. BANK DEPOSITS AND COLLECTIONS
A. Statute of Limitations - Payor Bank Liability for Failure to Take
Action Timely on an Item Payable by It
Under section 4.302(1) of the Code a payor bank, in the absence of a valid
defense, is accountable for the amount of a check presented on and received
by it if it does not pay or return the check or send notice of dishonor until
after midnight on its next banking day following the banking day on which it
received the check. 192 In Wider v. First City Bank of Dallas193 the court
held that the residual or "catch-all" four-year statute of limitations now
186. 821 S.W.2d at 634-35; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 3.419(a)(3) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968) and comment 3 to section 3.419. The plaintiff in Toro argued that the applica-
ble statute of limitations was the "four year statute" because his conversion claim was asserted
under the Code. The basis for the plaintiff's argument is unclear. The only four-year limita-
tions period provided under the Code is set forth in section 2.725 thereof; it applies to actions
for breach of contracts for sale. See supra note 73. The four-year limitations period provided
under Section 16.004 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code is inapplicable (perhaps the
plaintiff was contending that the conversion created a debt), and the residual four-year limita-
tions period provided under section 16.051 thereof applies only in the absence of an express
limitations period. See TEX. CIv. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. §§ 16.004, .051 (Vernon 1986).
187. 814 S.W.2d 424 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, no writ).
188. Id. at 427.
189. Id. The court cited Wertz v. Richardson Heights Bank & Trust, 495 S.W.2d 572, 574
(Tex. 1977) for the rule that a bank's issuance of a cashier's check is acceptance of the check
and constitutes the bank's agreement to honor the check as presented. 814 S.W.2d at 427.
190. 814 S.W.2d at 426; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.404, .307, 1.201(43) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968).
191. Id. at 427. The court quoted comment 2 to section 3.401 of the Code, which provides
in part that: "[a signature] may be made in any name, including any trade name or assumed
name, however false and fictitious, which is adopted for that purpose." TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 3.401 comment 2 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
192. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). A check is a
"demand item." See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.104(b)(2), .108, 4.104(a)(7) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968). The term "midnight deadline," as used in section 4.302(1), is defined in
section 4. 104(a)(8). TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.104(a)(8) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
193. 804 S.W.2d 160 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, writ denied).
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codified as section 16.051 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code,1 94 rather
than the two-year limitations period under section 16.003 thereof,1 95 is ap-
plicable to a suit based on section 4.302 of the Code. 1 96 In Wider the plain-
tiff sued the payor bank (alleging that it held several checks beyond the
"midnight deadline") three years and eleven months after the cause of action
accrued. The court first held that a suit "for violation of section 4.302 of the
[Code] is properly characterized as a suit for strict statutory liability."', 97 It
then held that the applicable statute of limitations is "former article 5529,
now section 16.051 of the [Civil Practice and Remedies Code]" on the basis
that the plaintiff's cause of action was not specifically listed in any statute of
limitations provision. 198
B. Damages for Wrongful Dishonor and Wrongful Offset
Section 4.402 of the Code provides that a payor bank is liable to its cus-
tomer for damages "proximately caused" by the wrongful dishonor of an
item, and it limits liability to actual damages proved when the dishonor oc-
curs through mistake.' 99 In American Bank of Waco v. Waco Airmotive,
Inc. 2o the court held that loss of credit is a "natural, probable, and foresee-
able" consequence of an offset or dishonor and that damages for loss of
credit are recoverable under either theory if the offset or dishonor is wrong-
ful and if the damages are supported by the evidence. 20 1
In addition to awarding damages for loss of credit, the jury also awarded
194. TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 16.051 (Vernon 1968). Section 16.051 pro-
vides that: "Every action for which there is no express limitations period, except an action for
the recovery of real property, must be brought not later than four years after the day the cause
of action accrues." Id. The plaintiff's cause of action accrued when the predecessor statutes to
sections 16.003, 16.004, and 16.051 of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code were in effect.
See TEX. REV. CIv. STAT. ANN. arts. 5526, 5527, 5529, repealed by Act of Sept. 1, 1985, ch.
959, sec. 9(1), 1985 TEX. GEN. LAWS 3242, 3322; TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE §§ 16.003,
.004, .051 (Vernon 1986).
195. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.302 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The payor bank
argued that the plaintiff's cause of action sounded in tort and was therefore governed by a two-
year limitations period. The trial court granted summary judgment in favor of the bank on
this basis. See 804 S.W.2d at 161.
196. 804 S.W.2d at 162.
197. 804 S.W.2d at 162 (citing New Ulm State Bank v. Brown, 558 S.W.2d 20, 28 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1977, no writ); and Marfa Nat'l Bank v. Powell, 512 S.W.2d
356, 358 (Tex. Civ. App.-El Paso 1974, writ ref'd n.r.e.)).
198. 804 S.W.2d at 162. See supra note 194. The court did not address the plaintiff's
argument in the alternative that a suit for violation of section 4.302 of the Code can be charac-
terized as an action for debt and therefore, is governed by the four-year limitations period set
forth in section 16.004(a)(3) of the Civil Practice and Remedies Code (or its predecessor, art.
5527) (see supra note 194).
199. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 4.402 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
200. 818 S.W.2d 163 (Tex. App.-Waco 1991, writ denied). See supra notes 20-22 and
accompanying text.
201. Id. at 174. The cause of action for wrongful offset of a general deposit account is
based on breach of the depository agreement between the bank and the depositor. Id. at 170.
In Waco Airmotive the court concluded that the jury's finding of wrongful offset also estab-
lished wrongful dishonor because the dishonor occurred solely as a result of the bank's prior
offset of the depositor's account. Id. at 173-74. The jury awarded $25,000 for "loss of credit"
damages. Id. at 174. The amount offset was $31,752.68, the full balance of the depositor's
account. The checks that were subsequently dishonored totaled $15,132.50. Id. at 175.
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$500,000 in exemplary damages for wrongful offset and wrongful dishonor.
The court held that exemplary damages are not recoverable for wrongful
offset because the cause of action is based on breach of contract, and
"[e]xemplary damages are not recoverable for ordinary breach of con-
tract. '20 2 The court, however, rejected the bank's argument (which was
based on section 1.106(a) of the Code20 3 and on the lack of express authori-
zation under section 4.402 of the Code 2° 4) that exemplary damages are not
recoverable for wrongful dishonor. The court noted that the Code does not
specify whether the liability under section 4.402 sounds in contract or in
tort,20 5 and that, while the Texas supreme court had not addressed the issue,
two courts of appeals have held that the liability is more in the nature of tort
than contract. 20 6 The court then held that "a finding that a bank acted with
malice or in reckless disregard of the rights of its depositor will support a
depositor's recovery of exemplary damages for wrongful dishonor of its
checks under section 4.402".207
V. LETTERS OF CREDIT
A. Warranties Made by the Beneficiary
Under section 5.111 (a) of the Code, unless otherwise agreed, a beneficiary
of a letter of credit, by making a demand for payment, "warrants to all inter-
ested parties that the necessary conditions of the credit have been complied
with."'20 8 In Sun Marine Terminals, Inc. v. Artoc Bank and Trust, Lim-
ited209 the Texas supreme court held that the terms of the agreement per-
202. Id. at 176 (citing International Bank v. Morales, 736 S.W.2d 622, 624 (Tex. 1987); Jim
Walter Homes, Inc. v. Reed, 711 S.W.2d 617, 618 (Tex. 1986)).
203. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.106(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). Section
1.106(a) provides that:
The remedies provided by this title shall be liberally administered to the end that
the aggrieved party may be put in as good a position as if the other party had
fully performed but neither consequential or special nor penal damages may be
had except as specifically provided in this title or by other rule of law.
Id.
204. The negative implication inherent in the statement in section 4.402 limiting liability to
actual damages when the dishonor occurs by mistake - i e., that damages are not so limited
when the dishonor occurs on some basis more culpable than a good faith mistake - was not
discussed by the court.
205. 818 S.W.2d at 176 (citing comment 2 to section 4.402).
206. Id. (citing Northshore Bank v. Palmer, 525 S.W.2d 718, 720 (Tex. Civ. App.-Hous-
ton [1st Dist.] 1975, writ ref'd n.r.e.); and Farmers & Merchants State Bank v. Ferguson, 605
S.W.2d 320, 326 (Tex. Civ. App.-Fort Worth 1980), reformed & affirmed, 617 S.W.2d 918
(Tex. 1981)).
207. 818 SW.2d at 176. See also James White & Robert Summers, supra note 50, § 18-4 at
898-99. The court did not reach the issue of the constitutionality of the jury's award of the
exemplary damages due to its remand of the case for a new trial. 818 S.W.2d at 177. The
court's characterization of the damages for loss of credit (in the context of its holding that the
trial court's exclusion of evidence that would have tended to refute the depositor's claim of loss
of credit was not harmless error) as "the only recoverable damages which were found by the
jury" appears to be a mistake. See 818 S.W.2d at 178.
208. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.111 (a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). See also TEx.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.103(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968) (definition of "credit" and
"letter of credit").
209. 797 S.W.2d 7 (Tex. 1990).
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taining to the transaction underlying the letter of credit must be examined to
determine whether the beneficiary's statements made to the issuer of the let-
ter of credit in the beneficiary's presentment documents were false and there-
fore, in breach of the warranty under section 5.111.210 In Sun Marine Artoc
Bank and Trust (Artoc) brought a cause of action against the beneficiary of a
letter of credit issued by another bank for the account of Artoc. The letter of
credit supported certain payment obligations of Artoc's customer to the ben-
eficiary under an agreement pursuant to which the beneficiary constructed
and operated a terminal for storing and loading gasoline from the customer's
refinery. When the customer failed timely to provide the beneficiary with a
replacement letter of credit, the beneficiary exercised its right under the
agreement to draw on letter of credit. Artoc acknowledged that the docu-
ments submitted by the beneficiary to the issuer - a sight draft for the full
amount of the letter of credit, a copy of an invoice covering services rendered
and not paid on the due date, and a letter stating that the customer failed to
pay the invoice in accordance with the agreement - complied with the
terms for payment under the letter of credit and that the issuer properly
honored the sight draft. Artoc, however, sued the beneficiary for, inter alia,
breach of the section 5.111 (a) warranty on the ground that the documents
submitted by the beneficiary to the issuer with the sight draft contained false
statements. Artoc contended that the beneficiary misrepresented that the
customer had failed to pay for services rendered when in fact the customer
was current in its monthly payments under its agreement with the
beneficiary.
The court acknowledged that "[t]he purpose of a letter of credit is to as-
sure payment when its own conditions have been met, irrespective of dis-
putes that may arise between the parties concerning performance of other
agreements which comprise the underlying transaction" 211 and that "the vi-
ability of a letter of credit as a payment device depends upon its indepen-
dence from the transaction of which it is a part." 21 2 The court stated that
this "independence principle" means that, subject to certain exceptions spec-
ified in section 5.114(b) of the Code,213 whether the customer and the benefi-
ciary have discharged their respective obligations to each other is irrelevant
to determining if payment is due on a letter of credit. 214 Artoc argued that
to refer to the agreement underlying the letter of credit to ascertain the truth
of a beneficiary's statement made to obtain payment would violate the inde-
pendence principle. The court rejected that argument, holding that the inde-
pendence principle is applicable in determining whether the issuer must pay
210. Id. at 11-12. The court observed that judicial authority interpreting section 5.11 l(a)
was scant, but that all authorities that have addressed the issue "agree that under section
5.111(a) a beneficiary warrants that all statements made in documents presented to obtain
payment are true." Id. at 11 (citing cases from other jurisdictions); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 5.111 (a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
211. Id. at 10.
212. Id.
213. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).




on the letter of credit (and noting that in this case payment had been made
and the letter of credit had served its purpose). 215 The court held that the
underlying agreement had to be examined to determine whether the benefici-
ary's statements in its presentment documents were true, since the agree-
ment, not the letter of credit, contained the parties' respective obligations. 216
The court then found that the beneficiary's statements were true since the
underlying agreement provided for acceleration of all remaining payments
upon the customer's failure timely to deliver a replacement letter of credit,
and since the beneficiary had rendered services (construction of the terminal
facility) for which it had not yet been fully compensated. 217 Accordingly,
the court held that the beneficiary did not breach its warranty to Artoc
under section 5.111(a) of the Code. 218
B. Demand for Payment; Modification
In Black v. Texas Department of Labor and Standards219 the party who
had posted cash collateral with a bank to support the bank's issuance of a
letter of credit contested the beneficiary's attempt to obtain payment on the
letter of credit by arguing, inter alia, that a demand letter sent by the benefi-
ciary to the bank did not constitute a draft as required by the letter of credit,
that the beneficiary's demand was not proper because it was mailed rather
than delivered personally, and that a transmittal letter from the attorney for
the bank's customer (i.e., the party for whose account the letter of credit was
issued) to the beneficiary was effective to modify the letter of credit. The
letter of credit provided that all drafts were to be marked "Drawn under
Letter of Credit No. 026, and presented at our counter at 3101 Bee Cave
Road, Austin, Texas by the close of business day on February 24, 1989. '"220
The court held that a demand letter may constitute a draft for purposes of a
letter of credit 22' and that the beneficiary's letter sufficed as a draft.222 The
court held that the demand complied with the letter of credit even though it
was mailed rather than delivered personally, since it was received by the
bank prior to the expiration date of the letter of credit, and since "[i]n this
noncommercial area, absolute, perfect compliance with the letter's terms
215. 797 S.W.2d at 11.
216. Id.
217. Id. at 12.
218. Id. The parties agreed, and the court held, that a beneficiary's warranty under section
5.111 (a) runs to interested parties, including the party for whose account the letter of credit is
issued (i.e., the issuer's customer). Id. at 11.
219. 816 S.W.2d 496 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, writ requested).
220. Id. at 500.
221. Id. (citing Temple-Eastex, Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793 (Tex. 1984); Travis
Bank & Trust v. State, 660 S.W.2d 851 (Tex. App.-Austin 1983, no writ)).
222. 816 S.W.2d at 500. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 3.104(b)(1), .104(c) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968) ("draft" is an order; as used in other chapters of the Code, the term may
refer to non-negotiable as well as negotiable instruments, as the context may require). The
beneficiary's demand letter in Black properly identified the letter of credit, stated that it was
payable in its total amount, recited other information evidencing that the circumstances under
which it was payable had occurred, and made demand for prompt and full payment of the total




was not required. ' 223 The court also held that the letter sent to the benefici-
ary by the attorney for the bank's customer, which was sent with the letter of
credit and which attempted to modify the letter of credit by limiting the
obligations for which the letter of credit served as security, did not alter the
bank's obligation under its letter of credit, since under section 5.104(a) of the
Code a modification of the terms of a letter of credit must be signed by the
issuer. 224
C. Injunction Against Beneficiary; Withdrawal
Under the Code an issuer 225 must honor a draft or demand for payment
that complies with the terms of the credit, even if the goods or documents do
not conform to the underlying contract between the customer and the benefi-
ciary. 226 Section 5.114(b) of the Code, however, provides that, unless other-
wise agreed, when a document on its face appears to conform to the
requirements of the credit but is forged or fraudulent or there is "fraud in
the transaction," then the issuer acting in good faith may still honor the
draft or demand for payment notwithstanding notice from its customer of
the forgery or fraud, but a court may by injunction prevent the honor.227
In First City, Texas - Houston v. Gnat Robot Corp.228 the account party
sought to enjoin the beneficiary from presenting or transferring a letter of
credit. In this case a letter of credit was issued by NCNB Texas National
Bank for the benefit of First City, Texas - Houston for the account of H.
Ross Perot. The letter of credit provided support for a loan made by First
City to Modem World Media, Inc., a company owned in part by former
Texas governor Mark White.229 As part of the loan transaction, Modem
World, White and another guarantor of the loan, and Gnat Robot, a com-
223. 816 S.W.2d at 501 (citing Temple-Eastex, 672 S.W.2d 793; New Braunfels Nat'l Bank
v. Odiorne, 780 S.W.2d 313 (Tex. App.-Austin 1989, writ denied)). The court in Black made
the same distinction as the court in Odiorne between those discrepancies (between the demand
for payment and the requirements for payment set forth in the letter of credit) that relate to the
commercial or business aspects of the underlying transaction and those that relate to the non-
commercial or banking aspects of presentment (such as proper identification in the draft or
demand for payment of the credit being drawn on). The Odiorne court recognized the general
rule that the beneficiary must strictly comply with the conditions for payment contained in the
credit, but it held that de minimis errors in the noncommercial requirements of the credit do
not violate the "strict compliance" standard. See 780 S.W.2d at 316-18.
224. 816 S.W.2d at 501. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.104(a) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1968).
225. "Issuer" is defined as "a bank or other person issuing a credit." TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 5.103(a)(3) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968).
226. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). See also com-
ment 1 to section 5.114, and supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
227. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.114(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992). Section
5.114(b)(1) provides that, in certain situations involving an innocent third party (e.g., demand
for honor by a negotiating bank or other person with a status equivalent to holder in due
course, and, if applicable, to whom a document of title has been duly negotiated or who is a
bona fide purchaser of a certificated security), the issuer must honor the draft or demand for
payment notwithstanding the fraud, forgery, or other defect. Id.
228. 813 S.W.2d 230 (Tex. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1991, n.w.h.).
229. The loan provided working capital and refinanced a prior $2,500,000 loan that was
used to purchase two radio stations in Beaumont, Texas.
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pany owned by Perot, entered into a stock option agreement pursuant to
which Gnat Robot was entitled to withdraw the letter of credit if Modem
World failed to pay Gnat Robot the costs of providing the letter of credit.
The loan agreement between Modem World and First City referred to the
option agreement, but the letter of credit contained no provision allowing
Gnat Robot or Perot to withdraw the letter of credit; nor did the letter of
credit refer to or incorporate by reference the option agreement.
Gnat Robot and Perot obtained an injunction from the trial court prevent-
ing First City from transferring or presenting the letter of credit, on the
grounds that (i) Modem World failed to pay Gnat Robot for the cost of the
letter of credit, (ii) Gnat Robot exercised its rights under the option agree-
ment to withdraw the letter of credit by so notifying First City, and
(iii) First City was bound by the terms of the option agreement. The court
held that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the injunction. 230
The bases for the court's holding were that (i) Gnat Robot and Perot did
not allege fraud or forgery,231 (ii) the letter of credit contained no with-
drawal provision and therefore could be withdrawn only by the agreement of
all the parties,232 and (iii) "[u]nless [a] letter of credit contains an explicit
reference to an underlying contract .... creating a condition for honoring a
draft, the underlying contract does not affect liability under the letter of
credit." 233
D. Wrongful Dishonor
In Agri Export Cooperative v. Universal Savings Ass'n 234 the beneficiary of
a letter of credit and the beneficiary's assignee brought an action for wrong-
ful dishonor against the issuer and sought to compel payment on the letter of
credit. Universal Savings issued the letter of credit in favor of Agri Export
as security for a loan made by Agri Export to a subsidiary of Universal Sav-
ings. The letter of credit was irrevocable and was payable upon default in
the payment of a referenced promissory note executed by the subsidiary.
Prior to the expiration of the letter of credit Agri Export demanded pay-
230. 813 S.W.2d at 234.
231. Id. at 233. Accordingly, exceptions under section 5.114(b) to an issuer's duty to
honor a draft or demand for payment were inapplicable. The court noted that the Texas
supreme court has held that presentment of a letter of credit may not be enjoined unless there
is a showing by the customer of fraud by the beneficiary (citing Philipp Bros., Inc. v. Oil
Country Specialists, Ltd., 787 S.W.2d 38, 40 (Tex. 1990)). 813 S.W.2d at 233.
232. 813 S.W.2d at 233 (citing Fina Supply, Inc. v. Abilene Nat'l Bank, 726 S.W.2d 537,
541-42 (Tex. 1987) (irrevocable letter of credit can be modified only with the consent of the
beneficiary and account party)). See also TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 5.106(b) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1968) (unless otherwise agreed, an established irrevocable credit may be modi-
fied or revoked only with the consent of the beneficiary and the customer).
233. 813 S.W.2d at 233 (citing Westwind Exploration, Inc. v. Homestate Say. Ass'n, 696
S.W.2d 378, 381 (Tex. 1985) ("disputes between the account party and beneficiary concerning
the underlying transaction are of no concern to the issuer"); Summit Ins. Co. v. Central Nat'l
Bank, 624 S.W.2d 222, 225 (Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st Dist.] 1981, writ ref'd n.r.e.)
("[t]he beneficiary's noncompliance with the underlying contract does not affect the issuer's
liability unless a reference to the underlying contract explicitly creates a condition for honor-
ing a draft")).
234. 767 F.Supp. 824 (S.D. Tex. 1991).
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ment on the letter of credit and presented a sight draft to Universal Savings
for the total amount of the credit, together with the original letter of credit
and a certification of default under the note. 235 Universal Savings refused
payment without explanation and retained the original letter of credit. In a
letter signed by Universal Saving's vice president, the expiration date of the
letter of credit was extended "in consideration of [Agri Export's] forbear-
ance ...in bringing an action against Universal for its alleged failure to
honor the letter of credit .... -236 Agri Export subsequently presented an-
other sight draft to Universal Savings for the total amount of the credit,
together with a certification of default, a photocopy of the letter of credit,
and a photocopy of the extension letter. Universal Savings again refused
payment, and Agri Export filed suit for wrongful dishonor.
The Resolution Trust Corporation, in its capacity as receiver of Universal
Savings, 237 denied liability on the basis that (i) presentment of the letter of
credit was improper, (ii) the letter of credit was void because neither the
note nor the extension of the letter of credit was supported by consideration,
(iii) the letter of credit was invalid because it was executed without proper
authority, and (iv) the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine238 and 12 U.S.C.
§ 1823(e)239 barred recovery since the letter of credit was neither approved
by the issuer's board of directors nor properly recorded in the issuer's
records.
The issuer contended that Agri Export's presentment was improper be-
cause two presentment requirements expressly provided for on the face of
the letter of credit were not satisfied, specifically (i) Agri Export failed to
present the original letter of credit or the original extension letter at the time
payment was demanded, and (ii) the certification of default delivered with
the demand for payment identified the note as one "payable to Agri-Export"
235. The terms of the letter of credit provided for payment upon the presentment of these
three items.
236. Agri Export, 767 F. Supp. at 826, 827.
237. The receivership followed a FSLIC conservatorship that began subsequent to the date
on which Agri Export filed suit. For convenience of reference, the term "issuer" is hereinafter
used for both Universal Savings and the RTC.
238. This federal common law doctrine is based on D'Oench, Duhme & Co. v. FDIC, 315
U.S. 447 (1942). In D'Oench a securities firm executed a series of notes payable to a bank
under an agreement that the notes would never be collected, the sole purpose of the notes being
to allow the bank to show "good" assets on its books. The bank subsequently failed, and the
notes were acquired by the FDIC in a purchase and assumption transaction. When the FDIC
sued to collect on the notes the maker raised defenses based on the side agreement and on lack
of consideration. The Supreme Court reviewed the statutory scheme that created the FDIC
and found a federal policy to protect the FDIC and the public against misrepresentations as to
the assets of insured institutions. To further this policy the court created a common law rule
of estoppel that precludes a borrower from asserting defenses against the FDIC based upon
secret or unrecorded "side agreements" that alter the terms of assets acquired by the FDIC.
239. See 12 U.S.C. § 1823(e)(Supp J. 1989). This provision was enacted in 1950 as an
amendment to the Federal Deposit Insurance Act (Pub. L. No. 81-797, § 2(13)(e), 64 stat.
931). It renders invalid as against the FDIC any agreement adverse to the interest of the
FDIC in any asset acquired by it from a failed financial institution unless the agreement is in
writing, was entered into at the same time that the asset to which it relates was acquired by the
institution, was approved by the board of directors or the loan committee of the institution




rather than "payable to the order of Agri Export." The court rejected the
issuer's first argument on the basis that the issuer's own actions in retaining
the original letter of credit after Agri Export's initial presentment prevented
Agri Export from presenting the original letter of credit with its second de-
mand for payment.24° The court further observed that the terms of the ex-
tension letter did not contain any requirement that the original extension
letter be presented.2 4 1 The court then held that the discrepancy between the
language in the default certification presented to the issuer and the form of
certification required by the letter of credit was probably insufficient to jus-
tify dishonor.242
The court also held that even if the issuer's arguments concerning im-
proper presentment were valid, the issuer was barred from asserting them
since (i) the letter of credit provided that the controlling law for any dis-
putes concerning payment would be (except for any conflicts with Texas or
federal law) the Uniform Customs and Practices for Documentary Credits
(UCP),243 (ii) Article 16(d) of the UCP requires the issuer of a letter of
credit to give notice of its decision to refuse the documents and to state the
discrepancies, 2 " and (iii) Article 16(e) of the UCP provides that if the issu-
ing bank does not act in accordance with the notice requirements, the bank
shall be precluded from claiming that the documents are not in accordance
with the terms and conditions of the credit. 245 The court held that the UCP
was controlling and that the issuer failed to comply with the notice provi-
sions set forth therein.
The court rejected the argument that the letter of credit was void because
of a failure of consideration on the underlying loan and a lack of considera-
tion for the additional time granted in the extension letter. The court re-
fused to examine the loan transaction based on the independence
principle,2 46 and it noted that the extension letter specifically provided that
the extension was granted in consideration of Agri Export's forbearance in
bringing action against the issuer for its failure to honor the letter of
credit.247
The RTC also contended that the president of the issuer lacked board
authority to issue the letter of credit and that it was therefore issued without
240. 767 F. Supp. at 828.
241. Id. The court also noted that the original extension letter was in the issuer's possession
in any event. Id.
242. Id. The court noted that under Texas law the beneficiary of a letter of credit must
comply strictly with the conditions of payment before the beneficiary is entitled to receive
payment thereunder (citing Temple-Eastex Inc. v. Addison Bank, 672 S.W.2d 793, 795 (Tex.
1984)), but that the language used in the letter of credit at issue could be construed as requir-
ing only that the certification clearly identify the note, rather than requiring exact adherence to
a specific recital. Id. See supra note 223 (de minimis errors with respect to the noncommercial
aspects of presentment are not fatal).
243. International Chamber of Commerce, UNIFORM CUSTOMS AND PRACTICES FOR
DOCUMENTARY CREDITS (1984).
244. Id., Article 16(d).
245. Id., Article 16(e).
246. 767 F. Supp. at 829. See supra notes 211-14 and accompanying text.
247. 767 F. Supp. at 829.
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authority and in violation of the Texas Savings and Loan Act.248 The is-
suer's files contained no board of directors' minutes specifically approving
the issuance of the letter of credit, and the evidence was unclear on whether
the president had actual authority to execute the letter of credit. The court,
however, held that the president nonetheless had apparent authority to exe-
cute the letter of credit.249 The court also refused to find that the issuer's
failure to comply strictly with certain rules and regulations promulgated
under the Texas Savings and Loan Act rendered the letter of credit invalid,
noting that these rules and regulations were not communicated to the is-
suer's customers (and therefore could not diminish its officers' apparent au-
thority) and that public policy is better served by protecting innocent third
parties who properly rely upon the apparent authority of an agent to act for
his principal. 250
The RTC further argued that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine and 12
U.S.C. § 1823(e) barred recovery by the plaintiff since there was no proper
record of the approval and issuance of the letter of credit in the books and
records of the issuer. 25 ' The court held that the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine
did not apply since the letter of credit was a "pure obligation" of the institu-
tion, rather than a side agreement relating to a loan or other asset of the
institution. 252 The court noted that this case involved no scheme or arrange-
ment likely to mislead banking authorities, and it refused to characterize the
letter of credit as a "secret agreement" merely because the issuer had poor
record keeping procedures. 253 The court also held that even if the D'Oench,
Duhme doctrine were applicable to a letter of credit, the "completely inno-
cent" exception articulated in FDIC v. Meo254 would have applied in this
case.255 The court noted that the RTC had "essentially agreed that Agri
Export [was] completely innocent of wrongdoing with regard to the letter of
248. TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 852A (1964 & Supp. 1991).
249. 767 F. Supp. at 830. The court stated that "Texas courts have long held that lending
money of a bank in the ordinary course of business would be within the authority of the bank's
officers .... It also has been held that issuing a letter of credit is within the scope of apparent
authority ordinarily entrusted to a chief executive officer of a bank". Id. (citing Goldstein v.
Union Nat'l Bank, 109 Tex. 555, 562, 213 S.W. 584, 591 (1919); FDIC v. Texas Bank, 783
S.W.2d 604, 607 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ)).
250. 767 F. Supp. at 830 (citing FDIC v. Texas Bank, 783 S.W.2d 604, 609 (Tex. App.-
Dallas 1989, no writ) ("before the FDIC is entitled to rely upon operating policies and proce-
dures to diminish an agent's apparent authority, it was the bank's responsibility to communi-
cate its operating policies to [its] customers")).
251. See supra notes 238-39.
252. 767 F. Supp. at 832.
253. Id. The court saw no basis for extending the D'Oench, Duhme doctrine to bar liability
under any unrecorded agreement that diminishes the general assets of the insuring institution.
While it stated that the Fifth Circuit court of appeals had not directly addressed the issue, it
observed that the Eleventh Circuit court of appeals had declined to so expand the FDIC's
powers. Id.; see Vernon v. RTC, 907 F.2d 1101, 1108 (11th Cir. 1990). The court acknowl-
edged that several federal district courts have been willing to apply the D'Oench, Duhme doc-
trine even when no particular asset was involved, but that those cases all involved "secret
arrangements likely to mislead banking authorities." 767 F. Supp. at 832; see Royal Bank of
Canada v. FDIC, 733 F. Supp. 1091, 1096-97 (N.D. Tex. 1990).
254. 505 F.2d 790, 793 (9th Cir. 1974).




The court held that section 1823(e) applies only to protect an interest in
particular assets acquired from failed financial institutions and that no such
asset was involved in this case.25 7 The court declined to broaden section
1823(e) to operate as a general shield against any claims against the failed
institution that do not meet the "official record" requirement of the
statute. 25 8
VI. DOCUMENTS OF TITLE
A. Scope and Enforcement of Warehouseman's Lien
In Import Systems International, Inc. v. Houston Central Industries259 the
court held that attorney's fees incurred by a bailee in attempting to collect a
debt secured by a possessory warehouseman's lien are not secured by the
warehouseman's lien. 260 Section 7.209(a)(1) of the Code provides that a
warehouseman has a lien against the bailor on goods in the warehouseman's
possession covered by a warehouse receipt. 261 This lien secures "charges for
storage or transportation .... insurance, labor, or charges present or future
in relation to the goods, and ... expenses necessary for preservation of the
goods or reasonably incurred in their sale pursuant to law."' 26 2 The attor-
ney's fees at issue in Import Systems were incurred by the bailee in connec-
tion with its attempts to collect accrued storage and freight fees from the
bailor.263 The court held that the attorney's fees incurred by the bailee to
enforce the warehouseman's lien or settle the dispute were not "reasonably
attributable to the sale of the goods."'264 The court further held that ex-
penses of sale that may be secured by a warehouseman's lien are "storage,
advertising, rental of facilities for the sale, and payment of auctioneers or
salesmen. '265 The court observed that other authorities do not support the
256. Id.
257. Id. at 833.
258. Id. at 833-34. The court noted that the effect of extending section 1823(e) and the
D'Oench, Duhme doctrine in the manner urged by the RTC would leave customers unsure of
the validity of banks' obligations to them. Id. at 834.
259. 752 F. Supp. 745 (S.D. Tex. 1990).
260. Id. at 745, 747-48.
261. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 7.209(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). See also
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 7.102(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991) (definitions of "bailee"
and "warehouseman"); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(45) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1968) (definition of "warehouse receipt").
262. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 7.209(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
263. 752 F. Supp. at 746. The bailor at the same time was attempting to retrieve its goods
from the bailee. The dispute arose after a buyer in Massachusetts rejected a portion of the
goods (shoes, in this case) that the bailee had shipped from Houston to the buyer at the direc-
tion of the bailor. The basis for the buyer's refusal to accept the shipment was its claim that
the shoes were infested with cockroaches. The bailee returned the shoes to its Houston facility.
Id.
264. 752 F. Supp. at 747 (emphasis original).
265. Id. The court noted that "[n]othing in the statute requires the retention of attorneys."
Id. The bailee perhaps should have argued that the attorney's fees were "charges present or




inclusion of attorney's fees within the charges and expenses secured by a
section 7.209(a)(1) warehouseman's lien. 26 The court was also influenced
by a Texas court of appeals decision267 that held that attorney's fees are not
secured by a Texas statutory mechanic's lien, even though the statutory pro-
visions as then in effect expressly allowed a mechanic's lien holder to recover
reasonable attorney's fees. 2 68
The bailor in Import Systems claimed that the bailee converted the goods
when it enforced its lien by selling the goods pursuant to section 7.210 of the
Code.269 Section 7.210(c) permits any person claiming a right in goods to
avoid a sale by paying the amount necessary to satisfy the lien plus the rea-
sonable expenses incurred by a warehouseman in enforcing its lien under
section 7.210. Prior to the sale the bailor tendered to the bailee a check in
the amount of the bailee's bill less the portion comprising attorney's fees.
The tender, however, was part of a settlement offer that contained a number
of conditions to its effectiveness. The court noted the common-law rule that
a tender of payment must be unconditional to be effective. 270 The court
further held that the bailor's conditional tender failed to discharge the ware-
houseman's lien and that, accordingly, since the bailee was entitled to sell
the goods, the bailee did not convert the bailor's property.27 '
VII. SECURED TRANSACTIONS
A. Scope
Section 9.104(10) of the Code provides that Chapter 9 does not apply to
the creation or transfer of an interest in or lien on real estate.272 In Kimsey
v. Burgin273 the San Antonio court of appeals held that a contract for
deed 274 created an interest in land and was therefore not governed by the
Code. 275 The court quoted language from an earlier opinion by it and from
266. Id. (citing 78 AM. JUR. 2d § 214; 60 TEX. JUR. 2d § 29; National Cold Storage Co. v.
Tiya Caviar Co., 276 N.Y.S.2d 57 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1966)).
267. Palomita, Inc. v. Medley, 747 S.W. 2d 575, 577-78 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1988,
no writ).
268. 752 F. Supp. at 748. See, e.g., TEX. PROP. CODE §§ 53.156, .176 (Vernon 1984). The
court concluded: "This court will not read attorney's fees into the warehouseman's lien statute
when the legislature has declined to include them, and where a similar, but more specific,
statute on mechanic's liens has been held not to include them." 752 F. Supp. at 748.
269. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 7.210 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
270. 752 F. Supp. at 748-49. The court cited Collision Center Paint and Body v. Camp-
bell, 773 S.W.2d 354, 357 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1989, no writ), as well as several other courts of
appeals cases that applied the unconditional tender rule. 752 F. Supp. at 748-49.
271. 752 F. Supp. at 749.
272. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.104(10) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). An excep-
tion (which is recognized in section 9.104(10)) is made for fixtures. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 9.313 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
273. 806 S.W.2d 571 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1991, writ denied).
274. A contract for deed is "[a]n agreement by a seller to deliver the deed to the property
when certain conditions have been met, such as completion of payments by purchaser."
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 325 (6th ed. 1990).
275. 806 S.W.2d at 576-77.
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another court of appeals case2 76 to the effect that under Texas law a pur-
chaser under an executory contract for the sale of real property acquires
equitable title to the property when the contract is executed or, in any event,
when the purchaser takes possession of the property.277 The court in Kimsey
rejected the seller's argument that the contract for deed was an executory
contract to purchase land upon fulfillment of the contract's obligations and
was therefore personal property until it ripened into real estate ownership. 278
The court held that the trial court correctly granted judgment for foreclo-
sure of the seller's deed of trust lien on the purchaser's interest in the
contract.
279
B. Continuous Security Interest in Minerals
The Code was amended in 1991 by the addition of a new section 9.203(c),
which provides that a security interest applicable under Chapter 9 to miner-
als upon extraction and that also qualifies under applicable law as a lien on
the minerals before extraction shall constitute, before and after production,
"a single continuous and uninterrupted lien on the property. '280 Section
9.203(c) also provides that it is declaratory of the law of Texas "as it has
heretofore existed and shall apply with respect to oil, gas, and other minerals
heretofore and hereafter produced."' 28 ' The legislative history of section
9.203(c) 282 indicates that it was enacted in response to a position asserted by
agents of the Internal Revenue Service that oil and gas, upon extraction from
the ground, become new property not previously in existence,283 with the
effect that security interests in the oil and gas taken by a lender prior to
production - when the oil and gas are real property 284 - lose their priority
to a subsequently-arising federal tax lien. 285
276. Furman v. Sanchez, 523 S.W.2d 253 (Tex. Civ. App.-San Antonio 1975, no writ);
City of Garland v. Wentzel, 294 S.W.2d 145 (Tex. Civ. App.-Dallas 1956, writ ref'd n.r.e.).
277. 806 S.W.2d at 576.
278. Id. at 575-77. The seller's characterization of the contract for deed as personal prop-
erty governed by the Code is puzzling in light of the parties' original treatment of the pur-
chaser's interest in the contract as a real property interest (see infra note 279) and the trial
court's judgment in favor of the seller for foreclosure of the seller's deed of trust lien.
279. 806 S.W.2d at 577. The seller had assigned to the purchaser seller's interest as pur-
chaser under a prior contract for deed on the same tracts of land. The purchaser defaulted
under a purchase-money promissory note payable to the seller. The note was secured by a
deed of trust lien in favor of the seller. The parties thus appear to have treated the purchaser's
interest as a real property interest from the inception of the transaction.
280. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.203(c) ('ex. UCC) (Vernon 1991); added by Acts
1991, 72nd Legislature, ch. 139, § 1.
281. Id; see Hess v. Bank of Oklahoma (In re Hess), 61 B.R. 977 (Bankr. N.D. Tex. 1986).
282. See Testimony on Tex. H.B. 2092 before the House Comm. on Energy, 72nd Leg. C.S.
(April 17, 1991).
283. This position is apparently based on the change in character of minerals upon extrac-
tion from real property to personal property. See, e.g., Phillips Petroleum Co. v. Mecom, 375
S.W.2d 335, 339 (Tex. Civ. App.-Austin 1964, no writ); Chapman v. Parks, 347 S.W.2d 805,
807 (Tex. Civ. App.-Amarillo 1961, writ ref'd n.r.e.); W.B. Johnson Drilling Co. v. Lacy 336
S.W. 2d 230, 234 ('ex. Civ. App.-Eastland 1960, no writ).
284. See Stephens County v. Mid-Kansas Oil & Gas Co., 113 Tex. 160, 254 S.W. 290, 292
(1923).
285. Section 6321 of the Internal Revenue Code creates the federal tax lien and provides
that it covers all real and personal property belonging to the debtor. I.R.C. § 6321 (West
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Section 9.203(c) confirms the effectiveness, as a continuous lien on miner-
als before and after production, of a security interest created under both
Chapter 9 of the Code and applicable real property law. For a lender with a
security interest covering minerals upon extraction and a deed of trust lien
covering the same minerals in the ground, section 9.203(c) provides assur-
ance that the legal nature of the minerals as real or personal property will
not affect the validity of the lender's security interest, and that the priority of
the security interest in extracted minerals will relate back to the time that
the security interest initially attached (by virtue of the deed of trust) to the
minerals in the ground.286
C. Perfection and Priorities
1. Chattel Paper
Chattel paper is defined under the Code as "a writing or writings which
evidence both a monetary obligation and a security interest in or a lease of
specific goods .... -"287 A security interest in chattel paper may be perfected
by filing or possession. 288 In First Interstate Bank of Arizona v. Interfund
Corp. 289 the court affirmed a trial court judgment awarding actual and puni-
1989). Section 6322 of the Internal Revenue Code provides that the lien arises at the time that
the assessment is made. Id. § 6322. Section 6323(a) of the Internal Revenue Code provides
that the lien imposed by Section 6321 shall not be valid as against any holder of a security
interest (or as against certain other enumerated parties) until notice of the lien has been prop-
erly filed. Id. § 6323(a). This language has been interpreted to mean that a tax lien primes
security interests (and the other enumerated interests) coming into existence after, but not
before, the time that notice of the tax lien has been properly filed. The implication inherent in
section 6323 is that the lien is valid from its inception as against all parties not expressly
protected by section 6323. Section 6323(b) and section 6323(c) give "super-priority" status to
certain interests. See Id. §§ 6323(b), (c). Under section 6323(h)(1) "[a] security interest exists
at any time (A) if, at such time the property is in existence and the interest has become pro-
tected under local law against a subsequent judgment lien arising out of an unsecured obliga-
tion, and (B) to the extent that, at such time, the holder has parted with money or money's
worth." Id. § 6323(h)(1). Given this statutory framework, the reasoning behind the IRS
agents' argument may have been along the following lines: a lender's security interest, taken
prior to production (typically at the same time that the lender acquires its deed of trust lien on
oil and gas in the ground), in extracted oil and gas is ineffective as a "security interest" vis-a-
vis an intervening federal tax lien filed prior to the commencement of production, on the
ground that the property covered by the security interest (extracted oil and gas, which is per-
sonal property under Texas law) did not "exist" at the time that the tax lien arose - so that
(i) the lender cannot avail itself of the "time of filing" rule set forth in section 6323(a),
(ii) under Section 6322 the tax lien became effective when the assessment of tax liability was
made against the mineral-interest owner, and (iii) under section 6323(a) the tax lien primes
the lender's security interest in extracted oil and gas when the lender's security interest comes
into existence upon the commencement of production.
286. The security interest under the Code should attach at the same time. See TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.203(a), (b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). The lender should perfect its
security interest under the Code by filing a financing statement in the office of the County
Clerk in the county where a mortgage on the real estate would be filed. See TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.302(a), .401(a)(2), .402 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). The lender's mortgage
may also serve as its financing statement. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.402(0 (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon 1991). The lender should also file a financing statement in the office of the
Secretary of State to cover oil and gas in transit after severance.
287. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(2) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
288. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.304(a), .305 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
289. 924 F.2d 588 (5th Cir. 1991).
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tive damages for conversion to a lender that held a prior, perfected security
interest in chattel paper comprised of (i) a contract between the lender's
borrower and the borrower's customer for the sale for $100,000 of an Ara-
bian horse named AK Kadira, (ii) a purchase-money note, and (iii) a secur-
ity agreement. 29° After the lender had acquired and perfected its security
interest in this chattel paper, the borrower entered into an agreement with
the defendant that set forth the manner in which the borrower could sell
certain horse sales contracts to the defendant. The agreement also allowed
the defendant to retain additional property of the borrower as security for
any indebtedness owed by the borrower to the defendant. The borrower sub-
sequently asked the lender to return the note evidencing the borrower's loan
to its customer in connection with the sale of AK Kadira, so that the bor-
rower could forward the note to the defendant for inspection for possible
purchase. The borrower forwarded the note, which was still indorsed to the
lender, to the defendant. In a series of deliveries over the next three months,
the lender sent to the defendant the original certificate of registration on AK
Kadira, an unrecorded UCC-3 evidencing an assignment of the lender's se-
curity interest in the horse to the defendant, and the note endorsed to the
defendant.2 9 1 With each delivery to the defendant, the lender included a
cover letter expressing the lender's understanding that the defendant
planned to purchase the chattel paper and instructing the defendant to re-
turn all documents to the lender if the defendant did not purchase the chat-
tel paper. The defendant failed to purchase or return the paper. It did not
respond to two written requests from the lender for the return of the docu-
ments; instead, it recorded the UCC-3 and sent in the registration certificate
for reissuance in its name as the owner of record.
The court rejected the defendant's contention that retaining the chattel
paper was lawful due to a provision in its agreement with the borrower giv-
ing the defendant the right to hold and apply (against indebtedness owed by
the borrower to the defendant) any of the borrower's property that came
into the defendant's possession. The court pointed out that the lender had a
prior security interest in the chattel paper that was perfected by filing and
possession. 292 The court also held that ample evidence, namely the lender's
290. Id. at 596. The lender's borrower owned and operated an Arabian horse farm. The
lender financed the borrower's operations with a line of credit secured by, inter alia, the bor-
rower's chattel paper and most of its horses and other inventory. The lender perfected its
security interest by proper filings. The borrower assigned and delivered chattel paper to the
lender as the borrower generated it through horse sales. Under criteria set forth in the loan
agreement between the lender and the borrower, some of the sales contracts were ineligible to
serve as the basis for an advance. The borrower began dealing with the defendant in this case
after the lender suggested that it sell its ineligible contracts and apply the proceeds to reduce
the borrower's indebtedness under its line of credit with the lender. Id. at 590-91.
291. The defendant had returned the note to the lender after a representative of the lender
informed the defendant that to complete the purchase of the chattel paper on AK Kadira the
lender needed to endorse and assign the note to the defendant.
292. 924 F.2d at 593-94 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.105(a)(2), .304(a),
.305, .301(a), .312(e)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991)). The court also noted that the defendant
did not acquire priority under section 9.308 of the Code as a purchaser of chattel paper, since
the defendant arguably never gave new value for the paper and, in any event, had knowledge of
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transmittal letters to the defendant describing the conditional nature of the
lender's delivery of the chattel paper and the lender's expectation that the
defendant was going to purchase the chattel paper, supported the jury's find-
ings that the lender neither consented to the defendant's retention of the
chattel paper nor waived its security interest therein.293 In upholding the
jury's award of punitive damages in an amount equal to the actual damages
awarded, the court said that sufficient evidence was in the record for a rea-
sonable jury to have determined that the defendant's actions were willful,
wanton, and malicious. 294
2. Proceeds of Collateral
In Aycock v. Texas Commerce Bank 295 a creditor with a perfected security
interest in certificated securities prevailed over a judgment creditor in a dis-
pute involving conflicting claims to a special account into which the issuer of
the securities had deposited liquidating dividends paid on the securities
pledged to the secured creditor. 296 The issuer of the securities had issued
dividend checks to the debtors who had pledged the securities to the secured
the lender's security interest. 924 F.2d at 594 n.2. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.308
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
293. 924 F.2d at 595. The court stated that section 9.306(b) of the Code "specifically pro-
vides for the express waiver of a security interest." Id.; see TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§ 9.306(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). Section 9.306(b) provides that, except as otherwise
provided in Chapter 9, a security interest in collateral continues notwithstanding disposition of
the collateral unless the secured party authorized the disposition. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. § 9.306(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). For another case within the survey period dis-
cussing the application of section 9.306(b), see Permian Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos,
934 F.2d 635, 649-51 (5th Cir. 1991) (provision in loan agreement allowing debtor to sell
collateral to a particular buyer did not authorize disposition of collateral where buyer offset its
obligation to pay for the goods against a pre-existing obligation of the debtor to the buyer).
294. 924 F.2d at 596. The court was unable to resist taking a final dig at the defendant's
position. It concluded: "We have examined the equine that Interfund presented for our in-
spection. Finding it to be a nag, not a thoroughbred, we dutifully relegate it to its proper
stall." Id.
295. 127 B.R. 17 (Bankr. S.D. Tex. 1991).
296. The secured creditor, some three years prior to the time that the judgment creditor
obtained its judgment against the same debtors, received the debtors' stock certificates, stock
transfer powers, and a written security agreement, as security for payment of a promissory
note executed by the debtors to back up a letter of credit issued by the secured creditor for the
debtors' account. These steps were sufficient to give the secured creditor a perfected security
interest in the securities. Chapter 8 of the Code governs the transfer of securities, including
certificated securities. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 8.102(a)(1), (a)(3) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991). Section 8.321 of the Code provides, inter alia, that (i) a security interest in a
security is enforceable and can attach only if the security is transferred to the secured party (or
the secured party's designee) pursuant to a provision of section 8.313(a) of the Code, (ii) a
security interest so transferred pursuant to an agreement by a transferor who has rights in the
security to a transferee who has given value is a perfected security interest, and (iii) Chapter 9
applies to the security interest, but no filing is required to perfect it. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE
ANN. §§ 8.321(a), (b), (c)(l) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). Section 8.313(a) of the Code pro-
vides an exclusive list of methods of transfer effective to constitute a valid "transfer" of a
security (including a limited interest therein, such as a security interest) to a purchaser. TEX.
Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 8.313(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). A "purchaser" under the
Code includes a person taking the interest as security. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN.
§§ 1.201(32), (33) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968)). One of the authorized methods of transfer for
certificated securities is delivery of the stock certificates to the purchaser. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. § 8.313(a)(1) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
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creditor. The debtors, however, never cashed the checks, so the full amount
of the funds deposited into the special account as dividends remained in the
account. The judgment creditor attempted to assert a garnishment or set-off
against the account, and the secured creditor intervened, asserting its secur-
ity interest.297
The court noted that a security interest continues in proceeds of collateral,
and that money, checks, and deposit accounts qualify as proceeds.298 Ac-
cordingly, it held that the secured creditor obtained a perfected security in-
terest in the liquidating dividends.299 Section 9.306(d) of the Code provides
that, with respect to a debtor who is the subject of insolvency proceedings, a
secured party with a perfected security interest in proceeds has a perfected
security interest only in certain proceeds.300 The types of proceeds subject
under section 9.306(d) to a secured party's perfected security interest in pro-
ceeds include "separate deposit accounts containing only proceeds. '301 The
court determined that the account at issue qualified as such a separate ac-
count because it contained only proceeds attributable to the pledged stock.
The proceeds thus remained identifiable and traceable. 302 Under section
9.306(c) of the Code a security interest in proceeds is a continuously per-
fected interest if the interest in the original collateral was perfected, but it
ceases to be a perfected security interest ten days after receipt of the pro-
ceeds by the debtor (except under limited circumstances enumerated in sec-
tion 9.306(c)). 303 The judgment creditor argued that the dividend checks
drawn on the special account and received by the debtors were the proceeds.
The court rejected that argument, holding instead that since the debtors
never cashed the checks, they never exercised dominion or control over, or
received, the funds in the account. 3°4
3. Rights of Buyer in Ordinary Course of Business Against Secured Party
A "buyer in the ordinary course of business" means a person who buys in
ordinary course from a person in the business of selling goods of the kind
bought and who acts in good faith and without knowledge that the sale vio-
lates the ownership rights or security interest of a third party. 30 5 Section
297. The court noted that, whether the judgment creditor was asserting setoff or garnish-
ment, "priority determines the winner." 127 B.R. at 19.
298. 127 B.R. at 18 (citing, respectively, TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.306(b), (a)
(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991)).
299. 127 B.R. at 19.
300. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). The debtors
in Aycock were in bankruptcy proceedings.
301. Id. § 9.306(d)(1).
302. 127 B.R. at 19. The court, in an opinion denying the judgment creditor's motion for
rehearing, held that the account did not lose its "separate account" status under section
9.306(d) of the Code because the depositing into the account of funds unrelated to the divi-
dends on the pledged stock constituted a commingling by the issuer, rather than by the debtors
(the unrelated funds were subsequently withdrawn). 133 B.R. 190 (Bankr. S.D. Texas 1991);
TEX. Bus. .& COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
303. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.306(c).(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
304. 127 B.R. at 19.
305. TEx. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(9) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
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9.307(a) of the Code establishes a general rule that a buyer in the ordinary
course of business takes free of a security interest created by the seller, even
if the security interest is perfected and even if the buyer is aware of the
security interest.3 6 In Bures v. First National Bank, Port Lavaca, Texas30 7
the court held that a lender that held the title certificate for a travel trailer
pursuant to a floor plan financing arrangement with its borrower (a travel
trailer dealer) may be liable to the buyer of the trailer for conversion for
refusing to deliver the title to the buyer.308 The floor plan financing arrange-
ment in Bures worked as follows: the lender retained the manufacturer's
certificates of origin as security for its loans to the dealer; when the dealer
sold a travel trailer he was obligated to remit the proceeds to the lender for
application against the dealer's indebtedness to the lender, and upon receipt
of the proceeds the lender would release the title to the trailer sold. The
dealer sold a travel trailer to Bures but failed to remit the sales proceeds to
the lender. The lender never released the title certificate to Bures' trailer.
Instead, the lender suggested that Bures consult an attorney, and it sent him
a letter, via certified mail, return receipt requested, (i) demanding either
payment of the amount that was due from the dealer, plus interest, or sur-
render of the trailer, and (ii) indicating that the lender would accelerate,
foreclose, and file suit against Bures if its demands were not met. Bures did
not pick up this letter, nor did he make demand on the lender for the title.
The trial court ordered the lender to release the title certificate to Bures
free of all liens, but it also instructed a verdict against Bures on his counter-
claim for conversion. The court of appeals reversed and remanded, holding:
(i) a cause of action may be maintained for conversion of a document of
title;3°9 (ii) a demand for the title and a refusal of the demand - usual
elements of a cause of action for conversion - were not required, because
the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have found that a demand by
Bures on the lender for the certificate would have been useless and/or that
the lender's actions amounted to a clear repudiation of Bures' ownership
rights in the certificate;310 and (iii) damages for conversion include loss of
use, and Bures' evidence showing inability to use the trailer and the amount
it would have cost to rent a comparable trailer was legally sufficient to estab-
lish damages. 311
A person cannot qualify as a buyer in the ordinary course of business
unless he buys the goods. The Code provides that "buying" does not include
306. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
307. 806 S.W.2d 935 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1991, no writ).
308. Id. at 938.
309. Id. (citing Lee County Nat'l Bank v. Nelson, 761 S.W.2d 851, 852 (Tex. App.-Beau-
mont 1988, writ denied); Nueces Trust Co. v. White, 564 S.W.2d 798, 806 (Tex. Civ. App.-
Corpus Christi 1978, no writ.)).
310. 806 S.W.2d at 938-39 (citing, inter alia, McVea v. Verkins, 587 S.W.2d 526, 531 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Corpus Christi 1979, no writ); and Loomis v. Sharp, 519 S.W.2d 955, 958 (Tex.
Civ. App.-Texarkana 1975, writ dism'd)).
311. 806 S.W. 2d at 939 (citing Southwind Aviation Inc. v. Avendano, 776 S.W.2d 734,
737 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi 1989, writ denied)).
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a transfer "in total or partial satisfaction of a money debt. '3 12 In Permian
Petroleum Co. v. Petroleos Mexicanos313 the court held that the use of a
contract credit by the transferee of liquified petroleum gas as an offset
against its obligation to pay for the gas was not "buying," since the trans-
feree gave no new value (the credit was a debt of the transferor that was in
existence prior to the time of the transfer of the gas).314 Accordingly, the
court held that the transferee was not a buyer in the ordinary course of busi-
ness and therefore, did not cut off the lender's perfected security interest in
the transferor's gas inventory.315
4. Rights of Holder of Worker's and Garageman's Possessory Liens
Against Secured Party
Section 9.310 of the Code gives a possessory lien held pursuant to non-
Code law priority over a perfected security interest (unless the lien is statu-
tory and the statute provides otherwise).316 For the possessory lienholder to
achieve this priority the lienholder must have furnished services or materials
with respect to the goods in the ordinary course of his business.31 7 In First
State Bank of Odessa v. Arsiaga3 18 a bank holding a prior, perfected security
interest in a truck was unsuccessful in a conversion claim against a repair
shop owner. The owner asserted possessory liens under subchapter 70.A of
the Texas Property Code for repairs and storage.319 Section 70.001(a) of the
Texas Property Code allows a worker who repairs a vehicle to retain posses-
sion of the vehicle until he is paid, and section 70.003(c) of the Texas Prop-
erty Code gives a garageman with whom a vehicle is entrusted a lien on the
vehicle for charges for care of the vehicle.320 The bank argued that the pos-
sessory liens lost their priority status because the repairman failed to observe
the notice requirements under section 70.006 of the Texas Property Code. 321
Section 70.006(a) provides that the holder of a lien on a motor vehicle under
subchapter 70.A of the Texas Property Code who retains possession of the
vehicle for thirty days after the date on which the charges accrue must notify
the owner and each lienholder recorded on the certificate of title.322 The
312. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(9) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992).
313. 934 F.2d 635 (5th Cir. 1991).
314. Id. at 649.
315. Id. at 648. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. §§ 9.306(b), .307(a) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991). The court rejected the transferee's argument that "buying" occurs if on the
date of the transfer the transferee intends in good faith to give new value (the transferee in
Permian did not determine until after the transfer of the gas that it was entitled to the offset
credit, but all the operative facts giving rise to the credit occurred prior to the date of the
transfer). 934 F.2d at 649. The court noted that neither section 1.201(9) nor section 9.307
contains timing or intent provisions. Id.; TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 1.201(9) (Tex.
UCC) (Vernon Supp. 1992); TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.307 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1991).
316. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.310 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
317. Id.
318. 804 S.W.2d 343 (Tex. App.-Eastland 1991, writ denied).
319. See TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. §§ 70.001 (a), .003(c) (Vernon 1984 and Supp. 1992).
320. Id. These statutes give possessory and lien rights with respect to other items as well.
321. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.006 (Vernon 1984).
322. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.006(a) (Vernon 1984).
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notice must be sent by certified mail, return receipt requested, and must in-
clude the amount of the charges and a request for payment.323 The
lienholder may sell the vehicle at a public sale if the charges are not paid
before the thirty-first day after the date on which the notice was mailed.
324
The court held that the notice requirement contained in section 70.006 of
the Texas Property Code is a condition to a possessory lienholder's right to
conduct a nonjudicial foreclosure sale, rather than a condition to perfection
of a possessory lien. 325 Section 70.006 does not stipulate any time period
within which a possessory lienholder must give the written notice; the
lienholder simply cannot sell the collateral until thirty-one days after proper
notice is given. The court in Arsiaga declined to interpret section 70.006 as
imposing any deadline for giving the notice of possession and charges and
the request for payment described therein. The court pointed out that the
bank could have contested the reasonableness and necessity of the storage
and repair charges at trial.3 26
5. Priority of Purchase Money Security Interest Over Conflicting Security
Interest
Section 9.312(d) of the Code gives a purchase money security interest in
collateral (other than inventory) priority over a conflicting security interest
in the same collateral or its proceeds if the purchase money security interest
is perfected at or within twenty days after the time that the debtor receives
possession of the collateral.327 In Cockrell v. Citizens National Bank of
Denton 328 the court had to determine the meaning of the term "possession."
The court held that "possession means that condition of facts under which
one can exercise power over property at his pleasure to the exclusion of all
other persons." 329
In Cockrell the parties entered into an agreement, dated August 1, 1985,
for the sale of the seller's mini-blind business, including the equipment at
issue. At the same time, the buyers paid a portion of the purchase price and
executed a promissory note for the balance. The note was secured by a se-
curity interest in the equipment. Neither the contract of sale nor any other
closing document mentioned delivery of possession of the equipment. Dur-
ing the ensuing sixty days, both parties had keys to the warehouse in which
the equipment was located. The seller during this time remained involved,
along with the buyers, in the day-to-day operations of the business, including
323. Id.
324. TEX. PROP. CODE ANN. § 70.006(b) (Vernon 1984).
325. 804 S.W.2d at 345.
326. 804 S.W.2d at 345. The court stated that storage charges would not be reasonable if
the facts showed that a mechanic secretly stored the vehicle until the storage charges exceeded
the value of the vehicle. Id. In this case the storage charges almost equaled the value of the
truck.
327. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.312(d) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
328. 802 S.W.2d 319 (Tex. App. - Fort Worth 1990, writ requested).
329. Id. at 323 (citing Citizens First Nat'l Bank v. Rushing, 433 S.W.2d 741 (Tex. Civ.
App.-Tyler 1968, no writ); BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1047 (5th ed. 1979)).
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the operation of the equipment. 330 On October 3, 1985, the seller surren-
dered his keys to the warehouse, and the buyers changed the locks and exe-
cuted financing statements covering the equipment. The seller filed these
financing statements on October 7, 1985.
The buyers' bank subsequently foreclosed on the equipment and sold it
pursuant to its security interest in after-acquired property under a security
agreement that was prior in time to the seller's security interest. The court
upheld the jury's finding that the seller perfected his security interest in the
equipment at or within twenty days after the buyers received possession of
the equipment, and it upheld the jury's awards of actual and punitive dam-
ages for conversion in favor of the seller against the buyers' bank. 331
The court noted that the Code does not define the term "possession" as
that term is used in section 9.312(d). 332 Since the jury charge did not proffer
a definition, the court held that the term "was to be given its usual and
ordinary meaning. ' 333 The court concluded that there was probative evi-
dence before the jury to establish that the buyers did not receive possession
of the equipment until October 3, 1985. 334
6 Effect on Security Interest in Accounts Receivable of Modification of
Underlying Contract.
Section 9.318(b) of the Code provides that, to the extent that the right to
payment under an assigned contract has not been earned, any modification
of or substitution for the contract is effective against an assignee unless the
account debtor has otherwise agreed, notwithstanding notification of the as-
signment, "but the assignee acquires corresponding rights under the modi-
fied or substituted contract. ' 335 This section is applicable to a creditor (the
assignee) holding a security interest in the accounts receivable of a debtor.336
In Bank One, Texas v. Communication Specialists, Inc. 337 the bank held a
perfected security interest in all accounts receivable of its debtor. The
debtor entered into a contract with a third party (account debtor) pursuant
to which the debtor would receive $47,780. The debtor, the account debtor,
330. The seller's continued involvement related to his retention of the right to receivables
and orders and his retention of liability for indebtedness accrued prior to August 1, 1985.
331. 802 S.W.2d at 324-25. The court reversed the trial court's judgment n.o.v. for the
bank and rendered judgment for the seller in accordance with the jury's findings. Id. The jury
found that the seller had made a demand on the bank for the return of the equipment, which
the bank refused, and that the bank acted with "wanton disregard" for the rights of the seller.
Id. at 324. The punitive damages were in an amount equal to approximately one-third of the
actual damages awarded. Id.
332. 802 S.W.2d at 323. The court was also unable to find any guidance from case law. Id.
333. Id. (citing Pena v. Ludwig, 766 S.W.2d 298 (Tex. App.-Waco 1989, writ requested
per TEX. R. App. P. 130(d))).
334. 802 S.W.2d at 323.
335. TEX. Bus. &COM. CODE ANN. § 9.318(b) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). The modifica-
tion or substitution must be made in good faith and in accordance with reasonable commercial
standards; the agreement between the assignee and the assignor may provide that modification
or substitution is a breach by the assignor. Id.
336. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.318 comment 2 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
337. 813 S.W.2d 755 (Tex. App.-Texarkana 1991, n.w.h.).
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and a subcontractor of the debtor subsequently entered into a substitute con-
tract pursuant to which the account debtor agreed to pay the subcontractor
directly. This change reduced to $24,206.61 the amount due from the ac-
count debtor to the debtor. A third party sought to garnish amounts paya-
ble by the account debtor to the debtor. The bank intervened, contending
that its perfected security interest in the debtor's accounts receivable gave it
priority with respect to the entire $47,780 over all other claims, including
those of the subcontractor. The bank argued that the substituted contract
was not effective against it under section 9.318(b) of the Code because the
bank did not receive corresponding rights under the substituted contract. 338
The court observed that section 9.318(b) would be rendered meaningless if
the court interpreted the "corresponding rights" clause in that section to
mean that a modified or substituted contract is effective against an assignee
only if it does not affect the assignee's collateral. 339 The court further ob-
served that if under the substituted contract an account receivable no longer
existed due to a change in contractual privity, "then there is no correspond-
ing right to which the assignee can be entitled. ' '340 The court concluded that
the bank was entitled to $24,206.61, which constituted the remainder of the
account receivable after the modification. 341
D. Disposition of Collateral by Secured Party After Default
1. Background
Section 9.504(a) of the Code provides that after a default by the debtor a
secured party may sell the collateral.342 Section 9.504(b) provides that the
debtor is liable for any deficiency unless otherwise agreed.343 Section
9.504(c) allows public or private sale but requires that every aspect of the
disposition be commercially reasonable. 344 The secured party must send to
the debtor reasonable notification of the time and place of any public sale.345
With respect to a private sale, the secured party must send to the debtor
reasonable notification of the time after which the sale is to be made. 346 No-
tice is not required, however, if after default the debtor has waived in writing
its right to notification, or if the "collateral is perishable or threatens to de-
cline speedily in value or is of a type customarily sold on a recognized mar-
338. Although not clear in the opinion, the only apparent basis for this claim was the
reduction in the amount payable due to the carving out of the payments to be made to the
subcontractor.
339. 813 S.W.2d at 757.
340. Id. (citing FDIC v. Registry Hotel Corp., 658 F. Supp. 311 (N.D. Tex. 1986)).
341. 813 S.W.2d at 758. The court stated that "(tihe corresponding rights to which the
assignee is entitled must be interpreted to mean that the assignee will still be entitled to such
collateral or accounts receivable to which the account creditor is entitled under the modified or
substituted contract". Id. at 757.
342. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.504(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
343. Id § 9.504(b). If the underlying transaction was a sale of accounts or chattel paper,
however, the debtor is liable for any deficiency only if the security agreement so provides. Id.





ket. '' 347 The Texas supreme court, in Tanenbaum v. Economics Laboratory,
Inc.,348 held that a creditor disposing of collateral under section 9.504 is
barred from suing for a deficiency if the disposition is not commercially rea-
sonable, or if the disposition is made prior to notification to the debtor (if
such notification is required under section 9.504). 349 Accordingly, the typi-
cal defenses asserted by the debtor or other liable parties in a secured party's
action to recover a deficiency are that proper notice was not given and/or
that the sale of the collateral was not conducted in a commercially reason-
able manner. Not surprisingly, therefore, a number of cases published dur-
ing this survey period dealt with notice, commercial reasonableness, and
deficiency issues arising under section 9.504.
2 Notice of Sale and Commercial Reasonableness
In Adcock v. First City Bank of Alice 350 the court affirmed a deficiency
judgment in favor of a secured creditor against guarantors of the indebted-
ness. The court held that an agreed sale of collateral pursuant to a work-out
arrangement between the secured creditor and a guarantor (who owned the
collateral) was not a sale "after default" and was not, therefore, subject to
the notice and commercial reasonableness requirements of section 9.504.3s1
Although the collateral was sold following default by the debtor on the in-
debtedness owed to the secured creditor, the court pointed out that the se-
cured creditor effectively waived the default by electing to work out an
agreement with one of the guarantors to sell the collateral and apply the
proceeds against the indebtedness. 352
In All Valley Acceptance Co. v. Durfey35 3 the court affirmed an award of
damages and attorneys' fees in favor of the debtors against a secured party
that sold the collateral (a mobile home) privately following the debtors' de-
347. Id. See, e.g., FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 527-28 (5th Cir. 1990) (notice not re-
quired for sale of securities on New York Stock and Bond Exchanges, since they are recog-
nized markets, even though the securities were those of a thinly traded corporation in
bankruptcy proceedings).
348. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982).
349. Id. at 771.
350. 802 S.W.2d 305 (Tex. App.-San Antonio 1990, no writ).
351. Id. at 307. The guarantor would have been considered a debtor for purposes of sec-
tion 9.504 had that section been applicable. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.105(a)(4)(Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991); see also Adams v. Waldrop, 740 S.W.2d 32, 33 (Tex. App.-El
Paso 1987, no writ); Carroll v. General Elec. Credit Corp., 734 S.W.2d 153, 154 (Tex. App.-
Houston [1st Dist.] 1987, no writ); Hernandez v. Bexar County Nat'l Bank, 710 S.W.2d 684,
687 (Tex. App.-Corpus Christi), writ ref'd n.r.e. per curiam, 716 S.W.2d 938 (Tex. 1986);
Peck v. Mack Trucks, 704 S.W.2d 583, 586 (Tex. App.-Austin 1986, no writ); but see James
White & Robert Summers, supra note 50, § 27-12 at 128-30 (Supp. 1991).
352. 802 S.W.2d at 306. The court also noted that to allow a debtor to avoid liability for
any deficiency remaining after an agreed sale of collateral would allow the debtor to take
advantage improperly of the secured creditor's good faith in seeking to bring its loan current
and avoid foreclosure. Id. at 307. The court noted that the potential for the type of abuse
targeted by Tanenbaum, 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982), was not present (in addition to being an
agreed sale, the collateral - shares of stock - was sold for book value, and the owner was
given a repurchase right). The court also observed that the evidence showed that the sale
satisfied the requirements of section 9.504. 802 S.W.2d at 307 n.3.
353. 800 S.W.2d 672 (Tex. App.-Austin 1990, writ denied) (per curiam).
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fault. The court held that (i) a letter sent by the debtors' attorney informing
the secured party that the debtors had vacated the mobile home and were
seeking damages did not constitute a renunciation or modification by the
debtors of their right under section 9.504 of the Code to notification of the
sale, because the letter was not signed by the debtors and did not mention
any waiver of the debtors' right to notice of sale,3 54 (ii) voluntary surrender
of collateral does not constitute waiver of a debtor's right to notice of sale,355
and (iii) no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether the debtors
received reasonable notification of the sale of the collateral, since the agree-
ment between the debtors and the secured party provided that the secured
party could comply with the statutory requirement of reasonable notification
by mailing notice of the sale at least ten days prior to the sale, and instead
the s cured party sold the collateral four days after mailing the notice of
sale. 356
In FDIC v. Lanier357 guarantors, asserting defective notice under section
9.504, challenged a deficiency judgment granted to the secured party follow-
ing sale of the collateral. The secured party's notice of sale stated that it
would sell the collateral at either a public or private sale ten days after the
date of the letter. The secured party sold the collateral (inventory) at a pri-
vate sale four months after it sent the notice letter. The court held that the
secured party gave proper notice of sale.358 It stated that "[t]he notice is not
defective simply because it does not specifically state that the goods would be
sold privately. ' 359 The court also rejected the guarantors' argument that the
notice was invalid because the sale occurred four months, rather than ten
days, after the notice letter was sent. 36° The guarantors in Lanier also con-
354. Id. at 674-75.
355. Id. at 675. Unless otherwise agreed, a secured party has the right to take possession of
the collateral after default. See TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.503 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon
1991). Sanchez v. MBank, 792 S.W.2d 530 (Tex. App.-El Paso 1990, writ granted), which
was discussed in the 1990 Survey, was argued before the supreme court on February 27, 1991,
but no opinion had been issued at the time of this writing. See John Krahmer, supra note 13,
at 145-46.
356. 800 S.W.2d at 675-76.
357. 926 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1991).
358. Id. at 465.
359. Id. The court's reasoning was that the notice "was adequate to 'inform reasonable
business persons' that their property would be sold within ten days or more .... Id. (citing
Siboney Corp. v. Chicago Pneumatic Tool Co., 572 S.W.2d 4, 6 ('Tex. Civ. App.-Houston [1st
Dist.] 1978, writ ref'd n.r.e.)); see also Hall v. Crocker Equipment Leasing, Inc., 737 S.W.2d 1,
2-3 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 1987, writ denied). The court noted that the notice
would have been defective had the secured party conducted a public sale, since the notice did
not specify the time and place of sale. 926 F.2d at 465 n. 1.
360. 926 F.2d at 465-66. The court cited comment 6 to section 9.504, which states that,
except for the ninety-day period applicable under section 9.505(a) to consumer goods in cer-
tain instances, "to encourage disposition by private sale through regular commercial channels"
no time period is established within which disposition of the collateral must be made. The
comment observes, however, that a secured party who delays a sale runs a risk of being found
not to have acted in a commercially reasonable manner or in good faith. TEX. Bus. & COM.
CODE ANN. §§ 9.504 comment 6, .505(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). See also TEX. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 1.203 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968); James White & Robert Summers, supra
note 50, § 27-12 at 604-06. But see FDIC v. Blanton, 918 F.2d 524, 529-30 (5th Cir. 1990)
(holding that even if the four-year delay by the secured party in selling the collateral after
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tested the commercial reasonableness of the sale on the ground that the sale
price was twenty percent of the collateral's cost and about fifty percent of the
price that the guarantors' expert asserted he would have been willing to pay.
The court held that the deficiency was not large enough to overturn the trial
court's finding that the sale was not commercially unreasonable, particularly
since the guarantors could show no procedural irregularities or any other
reason for the low sale price.361
In Knights of Columbus Credit Union v. Stock 362 the court held that the
cross collateralization of three loans was not a basis for including the unpaid
balances of two of the loans in the deficiency remaining after the sale of a
portion of the collateral following default on the third loan. 363 The court
held that the notice of sale was defective as a matter of law because it re-
ferred only to a possible sale of the collateral and did not state the time and
place of any public sale or the time after which a private sale would be
made.364 More significantly, the court held that the deficiency-bar rule of
Tanenbaum 365 did not prevent the secured party from maintaining its secur-
ity interests in the collateral not sold and its right to recover the balances
due under loans that were secured, in part, by the collateral sold at the defec-
tive sale. 366 The court noted that each loan advance was applied for sepa-
rately, had separate monthly payments, and had separate security
agreements covering different collateral (each agreement provided that the
described collateral secured all advances to the debtor under a particular
open-end credit agreement, as well as any other amounts owed to the se-
cured party at any time). 367 The court stated that "[t]fle notice letter itself is
dispositive on what deficiency is affected by the insuffi |ent notice. ' 368 Since
the letter referred to only one of the loan advances, the court limited the
secured party's loss of deficiency to that loan.369 The court also held that
default rendered the sale commercially unreasonable, the debtor was entitled only to credit for
the fair market value of the collateral at the time the collateral should have been sold, and that
the facts did not warrant presuming that the secured party had elected to retain the collateral
in full satisfaction of the debt; this decision imposed a questionable limitation on the Tanen-
baum decision, 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982) (see supra note 349 and accompanying text), by
apparently interpreting Tanenbaum as applicable only in situations in which the creditor's
actions prevent the debtor from determining the value of the collateral at the time of
disposition).
361. 926 F.2d at 467 (citing TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.507(b) (Tex. UCC)
(Vernon 1991), and noting that the debtor could have protected its interests by arranging
financing for a bid or by selling the collateral itself prior to the secured party's sale).
362. 814 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied).
363. Id. at 431-32.
364. Id. at 430-31.
365. 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982); see supra note 349 and accompanying text.
366. 814 S.W.2d at 431-33.
367. Id.
368. Id.
369. Id. at 432. The court stated that "[c]ross collateralization does not magically trans-
form three separate loans into one loan." Id. at 431-32. The court also noted that even if it
had accepted the debtor's argument that the defective sale barred any suit for a deficiency
under any of the cross-collateralized loans, the deficiency could not be determined until all the
collateral securing all the loans was sold. Id. at 432 n.2 (observing also that Tanenbaum, 628
S.W.2d 769 (Tex. 1982), does not suggest that the creditor's security interest is invalidated;
instead, it precludes any deficiency remaining after disposition of the collateral).
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the debtor's remedies under section 9.507(a) were likewise limited to losses
recoverable in connection with the loan identified in the letter.370
Van Brunt v. BancTexas Quorum, 371 which is comprised of two opinions
and two dissents (the original opinion and a dissent therefrom and the opin-
ion and a dissent on rehearing), is a significant decision that insulates lenders
holding loans secured by personal property and real property from the ad-
verse consequences of Tanenbaum.372 In its original opinion the court held
that the secured party failed to give reasonable notification to the debtor of
the secured party's sale of the personal property collateral at a private
sale, 373 and therefore, the secured party was not entitled to any deficiency
judgment.374 The court's opinion on rehearing left intact its original opinion
except as it applied to the secured party's right to seek a deficiency judgment
on the note that it determined was secured both by the personal property
collateral sold at the defective sale and by real property. 375 The court, in
interpreting section 9.501(d) of the Code,376 held that any defect in the se-
cured party's disposition of the personal property collateral under the Code
had no effect on the secured party's rights under its mortgage on the real
property, including its right to seek a deficiency on the note that was secured
by both the real and personal property.377 Judge Baker, in a well-reasoned
370. 814 S.W.2d at 432-33 (since the collateral was consumer goods, the debtor was able
to recover the minimum penalty set forth in section 9.507(a) without being required to prove
any loss). See TEX. Bus. & CoM. CODE ANN. § 9.507(a) (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991).
371. 804 S.W.2d 117 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1990, no writ). This case was decided during the
1990 Survey period but published during the current Survey period.
372. 628 S.W.2d 769 (rex. 1982). The breadth of protection provided by Van Brunt to
these lenders may, however, prove to be unavailable to lenders with cases outside the jurisdic-
tion of the Dallas court of appeals; for lenders with cases within such jurisdiction, the insula-
tion may prove to be frayed if and when the supreme court addresses the issue presented in
Van Brunt. See infra notes 377-79 and accompanying text.
373. Van Brunt, 804 S.W.2d at 121-22. The secured party first notified the debtor that it
intended to sell the collateral. It sent another letter stating that it would hold a public auction
and informing the debtor of the time and place. The secured party rejected all bids at the
auction and subsequently sold the collateral for a higher price in a private sale to one of the
bidders. The secured party did not give any notice to the debtor beyond the two letters de-
scribed above. The court essentially held that notice of a public sale is not sufficient notice of a
subsequent private sale. Id. Compare FDIC v. Lanier, 926 F.2d 462, 464-65 (5th Cir. 1991)
(notice of a "public or private" sale on a specified date was adequate notice of a subsequent
private sale). The dissent from the original opinion in Van Brunt argues persuasively that the
secured party's notices constituted reasonable notification of a public sale and/or a subsequent
private sale. 804 S.W.2d 123-25 (Kinkeade, J., dissenting).
374. 804 S.W.2d at 122.
375. Id. at 126-27. The other four notes were secured only by the personal property. The
court denied the secured party a deficiency judgment on those notes. Id. at 130.
376. TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.501 (d) (rex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). Subsection
(d) of section 9.501 provides:
If the security agreement covers both real and personal property, the secured
party may proceed under this subchapter as to the personal property or he may
proceed as to both the real and personal property in accordance with his rights
and remedies in respect of the real property in which case the provisions of this
subchapter do not apply.
Id.
377. Id at 130. The court's analysis in support of this holding seems disjointed and is not
particularly persuasive. The court cited various cases from other jurisdictions for the proposi-
tion that under section 9.501(d) of the Code a secured creditor may proceed against the real
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dissenting opinion on rehearing, pointed out that the majority's opinion evis-
cerates Tanenbaum in any case in which the debt is secured by both real and
personal property. 378 Judge Baker argued that the defective sale under the
Code should bar any deficiency remaining on the note following foreclosure
of the secured party's deed of trust lien on the real property.379
and personal property collateral in separate actions and that if it does so, the default provisions
of the Code apply only to the personal property. 804 S.W.2d at 128. This proposition is
inherent in the language of section 9.501(d) and is not dispositive of the issue (comment 5 to
section 9.501(d) also indicates that the Code defers to non-Code law to determine whether a
secured party can proceed against the personal property under applicable real estate law in a
separate action following an action against the real property, and that if such separate proceed-
ings are allowed the default provisions of Chapter 9 of the Code would not apply to either
action). The court invoked policy considerations, citing, inter alia, section 1.106 of the Code,
which provides for liberal administration of Code remedies to make an aggrieved party whole
and which limits the availability of penal damages. 804 S.W.2d at 128, 129; TEx. Bus. &
COM. CODE ANN. § 1.106 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1968). The general mandate provided by
section 1.106 should not serve as a basis for overriding the consequences of a creditor's breach
of a remedial provision under the Code; rather, it should bear on a court's analysis of whether
such a breach occurred. The court misinterprets both Tanenbaum, 628 S.W.2d 769 (Tex.
1982), and the arguments made in the dissenting opinion in Van Brunt on rehearing. The
court states that Tanenbaum held that the creditor was deemed to have elected to retain the
collateral in complete satisfaction of the debt because the creditor failed to comply with the
notice provisions of section 9.504(c). 804 S.W.2d 128, 129. In Tanenbaum the supreme court
held that the creditor in effect retained the collateral in full satisfaction of the debt pursuant to
section 9.505 of the Code because the creditor destroyed the collateral. 628 S.W.2d at 772; see
TEX. Bus. & COM. CODE ANN. § 9.505 (Tex. UCC) (Vernon 1991). The court in Tanenbaum
also held that a creditor's failure to comply with the notice and commercial reasonableness
provisions of section 9.504 in connection with a disposition of the collateral bars a suit for a
deficiency. 628 S.W.2d at 771-72. As the dissenting opinion in Van Brunt pointed out on
rehearing, "[foreclosing on the real property is not the seeking of a deficiency, so such action
is not barred by Tanenbaum." 804 S.W.2d at 131 (Baker, J., dissenting). The Dallas court of
appeals has apparently discarded its interpretation of Tanenbaum as set forth in Van Brunt in
favor of the interpretation espoused by Baker in his dissenting opinion. See Knights of Colum-
bus Credit Union v. Stock, 814 S.W.2d 427 (Tex. App.-Dallas 1991, writ denied) (discussed
supra in notes 362-70 and accompanying text).
378. 804 S.W.2d at 131 (Baker, J., dissenting). Baker stated:
[T]he majority effectively holds that Tanenbaum's prohibition against suing for
a deficiency is really not a prohibition if the debt was also secured by real prop-
erty, despite the fact that the creditor has not complied with the provisions of
section 9.501(d) allowing avoidance of the Code default provisions as to the
personal property.
Id.
379. Id. See supra note 377.
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